The Famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine: an anatomy of the Holodomor, by Stanislav Kulchytsky/translated by Ali Kinsella/preface by Bohdan Klid, Toronto, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2018, xxii + 175 pp., US$31.95 (paperback), ISBN 978-1-894865-53-1

Tasked with developing an official Soviet response to the United States Commission on the Ukraine Famine, Stanislav Kulchytsky began his Holodomor research in the 1980s. One of the first Ukrainian scholars to conduct research on the topic, he initially acknowledged the famine's occurrence, yet only as an accidental outcome of collectivization. In independent Ukraine, his scholarly treatment of the Soviet Union and the Holodomor evolved significantly. *Ukraiins'kyi Holodomor v konteksti polityky Kremlia pochatku 1930-xrr*, (2014) represents the culmination of over three decades of research, thought, and writing on Soviet Ukraine and the Holodomor. This volume is a revised, edited, and translated version of the 2014 text.

Famine decimated Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and Lower Volga from 1932 to 1933. Millions starved. Ukrainians and diaspora members have since named this famine the Holodomor, "death by hunger," and agitated for states and supranational organizations to recognize it as a Genocide. As Kulchytsky underscores, they often use false comparisons to racially motivated Genocides and/or employ misnomers like "the Ukrainian Holocaust" to do so. While Kulchytsky concurs that the Holodomor constituted Genocide, he argues that it represents a unique variant, rooted in Soviet socio-economic policy. He analyzes the peculiarities of the Holodomor alongside ongoing socio-economic processes, so that it might be deemed a Genocide on its own terms. To do this, Kulchytsky identifies key historical developments predating the Holodomor, homing in on Lenin and Stalin's varied attempts to Sovietize the countryside, and reveals the "anatomy of the Holodomor." He contends that this "anatomy" includes four significant and overlapping steps that the Stalinist regime took

to intentionally murder "the Ukrainian people" – the confiscation of all foodstuffs, physical barricades, information blockades, and selective assistance.

Kulchytsky organizes the text semi-chronologically, into a preface, six chapters and an afterword. A full reproduction of Alexander Weinerburger's photo album, "The Famine Tragedy in South Russia," appears near the middle. The first four chapters treat socio-economic processes in the Soviet Union's early decade, always with an eye towards the Holodomor. Kulchytsky contends that the Holodomor became part and parcel of economic measures, taken by Lenin and Stalin to achieve "socialism on all fronts." The Soviet government, urban workers, and revolutionary efforts depended on agricultural products; thus, Lenin began the process of collectivizing agriculture under the auspices of war communism from 1918. Peasants pushed back, withholding grain reserves, slowing or stopping work, and/or committing armed uprisings. A pragmatist, Lenin adjusted the state's approach to the peasant question, instituting the New Economic Policy (NEP), allowing peasants to keep and sell any surplus they produced. He introduced a "divide and conquer" strategy, which sorted peasants into *kulaks* (wealthy peasants), *seredniaks* (middle peasants), and *bedniaks* (poor peasants) on paper. The latter's ostensible animosity towards the former would prevent any sort of collective agricultural identity or action. As Lenin implemented NEP, he also forged a plan for grappling with the national questions – *korenizatsiia*, or indigenization. Kulchytsky claims that this effort, allowing ethnic Ukrainians to participate in the party and state life, quelled nationalist calls.

Kulchytsky ascertains that Lenin's pragmatist reforms had, for the most part, pacified Ukrainian peasants when Stalin ascended to power. From the aforementioned reforms, a mode of hybrid Soviet identity crystalized, rooted in both nationality and (perceived) class origins. Ukrainian nationality and agricultural identity – *kulak, seredniak*, or *bedniak* – functioned hand in hand. Thus, when Stalin, a hard-headed idealist, began rolling back Lenin's reforms in order to actualize "socialism on all fronts," he perceived Ukraine as a dual front – national and economic. Initially, Stalin hoped that a virulent dekulakization campaign, rapid collectivization, and annually ratcheting up grain procurement would push independent farmers onto collective farms, which would provide the state with its food needs. Yet, realizing the mutability of the kulak category and fearful that the state would take everything, agricultural producers began to imagine themselves as a cohesive class. Capitalizing on the state's dependence on them, they banded together to protect their rights to private garden plots and milk cows. According to Kulchytsky, these little concessions only perturbed Stalin. He responded with a "crushing blow," the Holodomor.

In the final chapters, Kulchytsky examines the "All Union Famine" and the Holodomor, carefully mapping their divergence. Ukraine's population suffered losses at up to 15 times that of other locations, save Kazakhstan. Intermediaries not only confiscated grain and approved forms of "payment in kind," but also *all* food. They erected physical and economic blockades, blacklisting entire villages and closing the Russian-Ukrainian border. Simultaneously, the state divvied out aid to select collective farms. As famine deaths soared, the state punished public references to famine and harshly curtailed listing starvation as a cause of death. Combined, these actions transcend an accidental outcome, demonstrating Stalin's Genocidal intent.

Overall, Kulchytsky draws much-needed attention to *both* class and nationality's roles in Stalin's targeted attacks on "the Ukrainian people." He carefully parses the "All Soviet Famine" from the Holodomor, Marxism from communism, Lenin's policies from Stalin's; yet, he fails to do the same of the "Ukrainian people." He does not systematically engage Ukraine's tremendous national diversity. Stalin expressed his intent to wipe out unruly peasants, "Petlyurites" (supporters of nationalist leader Symon Petliura), "bourgeois nationalism" and "white guardists." This undoubtedly included a myriad of minority national groups in Ukraine.

Kulchytsky's work opens the door for further research into the famine's economic and national intersectionality for these groups.

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