

“жид” и “еврей” и многое другое, выпадающее из позитивной парадигмы переплетенных историй групп, еврейская и украинская идентичность которых очевидна для авторов.

Хочется надеяться, что книга “Евреи и украинцы” будет оценена как важный шаг в направлении к преодолению национальной эксклюзивности исторических нарративов, а ограничения подхода Петровского-Штерна и Магочи будут учтены следующими поколениями историков, которые пойдут по их стопам. Большинство же рядовых читателей безусловно выиграет, прочитав эту книгу и осознав, что история группы, с которой они себя соотносят, развивалась в тесном переплетении с историей группы, которая им часто представляется как совершенно отдельная и иная.



Oleh WOLOWYNA

Andrij Makuch and Frank Sysyn (Eds.), *Contextualizing the Holodomor: The Impact of Thirty Years of Ukrainian Famine Studies* (Edmonton and Toronto: CIUS Press, 2015). 126 pp. ISBN: 978-1-894865-43-2.

This volume contains five chapters based on papers presented at the conference “Contextualization the Holodomor: A Conference on the 80th Anniversary,” held at the University of Toronto on September 27–28, 2013, and a shorter introductory text by Frank Sysyn that provides a background to the five chapters. The five papers are: Olga Andriiewska, “Towards a Decentralized History: The Study of the Holodomor and Ukrainian Historiography”; Andrea Graziosi, “The Impact of Holodomor Studies on the Understanding of the USSR”; Francois Thom, “Reflections on Stalin and the Holodomor”; Stanislav Kul’chyts’kyi, “The Holodomor of 1932–33: How and Why?”; and Norman M. Naimark, “How the Holodomor Can Be Integrated into Our Understanding of Genocide.”

The main contribution of Sysyn’s introductory text, “Thirty Years of Research on the Holodomor: A Balance Sheet,” is a description of the genesis of Robert Conquest’s seminal book *The Harvest of Sorrow* and a comprehensive list of the

extraordinary number of reviews of the book. Sysyn's title is somewhat misleading (in fact, it seems more suitable as a title of Olga Andriewska's contribution, which presents a very thorough review of scholarly work, mostly by historians, on the Holodomor in the past thirty years).

In spite of the extraordinary number of works on the Holodomor (more than 20,000 according to Kul'chyts'kyi), there is still little consensus among historians about the key factors related to the *why* of the Holodomor and its dynamics. Graziosi, referring to de-kulakization, collectivization, and famines starting in 1919, states that "classes had but a marginal (although certainly not non-existent) role on what was basically an original, ideologically inspired, very violent and primitive state-building attempt" (P. 52). He claims that there is a strong connection between the peasant revolts of 1918–20 and resistance to these events in 1930–31, and posits a direct relationship between levels of past resistance and Holodomor losses in 1932–33 (this connection is also mentioned by Andriewska). Graziosi then links Stalin's assertion that "in essence, the national question is a peasant question" with the *why* of the Holodomor. Thus we have a logical chain: peasant resistance – the nationality question as a peasant question – famine-terror as a means for breaking Ukrainian

peasants' resistance to collectivization and independence aspirations.

Kul'chyts'kyi, on the other hand, claims that "class-based destruction led to the Holodomor" (P. 89). He frames his analysis on the genesis and intent of the Holodomor squarely in the context of factors such as Marxist ideology, the elimination of private property (of the peasants), and the imposition of state control of agricultural production. He divides the 1932–33 famine into two parts: a general famine affecting different parts of the Soviet Union during most of 1932, and famine-terror starting in late 1932 through the first part of 1933. Kul'chyts'kyi argues that this second part is the actual Holodomor-genocide. The genocide was caused by Stalin's "shattering blow," with total confiscation not just of grain but all food, and physical blockades eliminating the possibility of peasants to search for food in Russia or cities in Ukraine. The result was a tenfold increase in rural mortality in Ukraine between January and June of 1933, a unique phenomenon among man-made famines in the twentieth century. Thom explains Stalin's imposition of collectivization and de-kulakization policies on the Politburo and the Communist apparatus by a strategy of dissimulation and deception, characterized by tactical retreats at critical moments and the identification of Stalin's personal power with the power of the Soviet state.

Both Andriewska and Graziosi point out the scarcity of knowledge about the social and cultural long-term effects of the Holodomor, such as the psychological individual and collective effects of starvation, resulting in changes in moral and ethical consciousness, passivity, lack of self-respect, and so forth. Andriewska discusses the rupture produced by the Holodomor in the history of Ukraine, with the “end of a set of social structures, institutions and social practices associated with Cossack history and culture of Ukraine” (P. 39). Both authors call for the development of “history from below” in Holodomor studies.

The correlation between peasant resistance and Holodomor-related fatalities, proposed by Graziosi, suggests another research question. There is a need for research on historical memory and the documentation of rebellions in specific areas as a factor that might have provoked targeted repressions, which resulted in increased Holodomor death toll in those areas (a point also mentioned by Andriewska). This hypothesis is based on the seminal research by Viola and Graziosi on peasant rebellions and some anecdotal documents

cited by both authors.¹ However, the data on peasant rebellions presented by Viola and Graziosi are too general, as they apply to large regions in Russia and Ukraine as a whole. Recent research on peasant rebellions in particular localities in Ukraine is promising, but more research at the regional (*oblast*) and district (*raion*) level is needed to adequately verify this hypothesis.²

Three conclusions about the current state of Holodomor research can be drawn from the chapters discussed above: there is an acute need for close collaboration between historians and demographers; comparative studies of the effects of the 1932–33 famine in different parts of the Soviet Union are still insufficient, especially those comparing the situation in different regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation; it is necessary to synthesize the large amount of knowledge accumulated so far.

The first problem (a lack of collaboration between historians and demographers) becomes evident in rather misleading assertions by the authors, such as Andriewska’s claim: “As virtually every demographer and historian who has considered

¹ Andrea Graziosi. *The Great Soviet Peasant War: Bolsheviks and Peasants, 1917–33*. Cambridge, 1996; Lynn Viola. *Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance*. New York, 1996.

² See R. Krutsik. *Narodna viina, 1917–1932: Putivnik do ekspozitsii*. Kyiv, 2011; V. Patrialiak. *Opir Ukraïns’kogo selianstva sotsial’no-ekonomichnim zakhodam radians’koi vladi u 1927–1933 rr./ Avtoferat diss... k.i.i.* Kyiv, 2012.

this question [estimates of Holodomor losses] has noted, however, a precise figure cannot be established because of serious problems with Soviet census materials, especially the 1937 and 1939 data” (P. 24). To accurately estimate the numbers of Holodomor victims, a proper demographic analysis requires not only accurate census data but also complete vital statistics (on births and deaths), as well as information on migrations. The Soviet censuses of the late 1930s have been properly studied by historical demographers, so historians of the Holodomor can rely on their findings without struggling to sort out those “serious problems” themselves.³ In fact, modern demographic analysis allows us to produce a fairly precise estimate of the direct victims of Holodomor at 3.9 million (plus or minus 5 percent).⁴

Likewise, Andriewska presents some “preliminary results” on the

comparative scale of deaths caused by the Holodomor by regions, suggesting that “without more research on migration patterns, resettlement policies and local history in the late 1920s and early 1930s, however, it is far too early to arrive at any definitive conclusions” (P. 25). It is necessary to point out that demographers have produced detailed estimates of losses by regions and a comprehensive analysis of migrations,⁵ and Hennadii Yefimenko has studied the resettlement of peasants from Russia and Belarus in 1933–34 to selected villages in Ukraine decimated by the famine.⁶

Approaches to the subject by historians and demographers exhibit serious methodological differences as well as discrepancies between the conclusions based on archival documents and those made after quantitative analysis of data. These differences lead to occasional misunderstandings on behalf of historians,

³ When the 1937 census materials became available in the 1990s, demographers made a careful evaluation of these data and came to the conclusion that they were, in general, quite accurate. (See: M. Tolts. *Repressirovannaia perepis' // Rodina*. 1989. No. 11. Pp. 56–61; A. Volkov. *Perepis' naseleniia 1937 goda: vymysly i pravda // Ekspress-informatsiia. Seriia "Istoriia statistiki"*. Vol. 3–5. No. 2. Moscow, 1990. Pp. 6–63; F. D. Livshits. *Perepis' naseleniia 1937 goda // Demograficheskie protsessy v SSSR*. Moscow, 1990. Pp. 174–207.) As was suspected long ago, the 1939 census was deliberately falsified, which became the topic of extensive analysis in O. Rudnytskyi, N. Levchuk, O. Wolowyna, P. Shevchuk and Alla Kovbasiuk. *Demography of a Man-Made Human Catastrophe: The Case of Massive Famine in Ukraine 1932–1933 // Canadian Studies in Population*. 2015. Vol. 42. No. 1–2. Pp. 53–80.

⁴ *Ibid.* P. 68.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Hennadii Yefimenko. *Pereselennia ta deportatsiia v postgolodomorni roki (1933–1936): Poraionnii zriz*, <http://gis.huri.harvard.edu/images/pdf/Relocation-1933-1936.pdf>.

such as the following statement by Andriewska: “Stephen Wheatcroft ... recently challenged the notion that there was a correlation between blacklisting villages and mortality based on raion (district) data. Without reliable data and local history at the village level, however, it is premature to dismiss the significance or outcome of ‘blacklisting’” (P. 27). From a demographer’s perspective, this is a problematic conclusion. First, Wheatcroft relied on crude mortality rates by districts, which measure total mortality, whereas the effect of blacklisting can be meaningfully assessed using only Holodomor-related losses. Second, very few districts were blacklisted entirely (it was mostly villages or individual collective farms). Thus, a proper verification of this hypothesis requires a careful analysis of the blacklisting data to determine the validity of associating a blacklisted village or collective farm with the death toll in the whole district.

Similarly, Kul’chyts’kyi made an important statement but undermined it by the chosen line of argumentation:

The levels of state grain requisitions throughout the regions were set arbitrarily, and we will not be able to substantiate with documents why Ukraine was forced to give the state 7,675,000 tons of grain from the 1930 har-

vest, while the Central-Black Earth oblasts, the Middle Volga krai, the Lower Volga krai, and the North Caucasus krai altogether delivered a total of 7,356,000 tons (Davis and Wheatcroft 470). Neither during the NEP years nor in the pre-revolutionary period had Ukraine ever produced as much grain as the four highly productive agricultural regions of European Russia taken together. And if we superimpose the state grain delivery statistics onto Lynne Viola’s regional statistics of peasant uprisings in 1930 (4,098 in the Ukrainian SSR and a total of 4,214 in the four Russian regions), then **it becomes clear** that the Kremlin was using the grain procurements as an instrument for punishing the rebellious Ukrainian peasants (Pp. 109–110).

The evidence Kul’chyts’kyi presents does not seem to support this conclusion. While the amount of grain demanded from Ukraine seems to be excessive, the total number of peasant uprisings, as reported by Viola, was lower in Ukraine than in the four Russian regions. However, if we apply a common demographic technique, that is, standardizing the number of uprisings by the respective rural population, we have 165

uprisings per 1,000,000 rural population in Ukraine and 151 in the four Russian regions. This more accurate measure of the number of uprisings is more consistent with Kulchytskyi's conclusion. Still, it remains unclear whether the scale of peasant uprisings became a factor determining the apparently excessive level of state grain requisitions in Ukraine.

The second problem highlighted by the book (the lack of comparative studies of the 1932–33 famine in different parts of the Soviet Union) can be illustrated by Andriewska's claim that Holodomor in Ukraine was "paralleled only in the ethnically Ukrainian Kuban region of the North Caucasus" (P. 23). Meanwhile, the severity of famine in some regions of the Russian Federation in the fall of 1932 and in 1933 is also mentioned in Graziosi's and Kulchytskyi's chapters of the book. Furthermore, a fair amount of research has been done on the famine in Kazakhstan and some regions of Russia, especially in the Kuban region of the Northern Caucasus. At the same time, no comprehensive comparative analysis of the effects of the 1932–33 famine in different regions of Ukraine and Russia has been done by either Ukrainian or Russian historians or demogra-

phers, even though Russian (and some Ukrainian) historians have consistently claimed that "the famine was not a uniquely Ukrainian experience, but rather a 'common tragedy shared by all the people of the former Soviet Union'" (P. 33). As some preliminary research on the 1932–33 famine in comparative perspective has shown, only three Soviet republics – Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia – were significantly affected by that famine. Other republics experienced relatively small or practically no increase in mortality. According to preliminary estimates of losses in seventeen Russian regions by a group of U.S. and Ukrainian demographers, only in the Krasnodar region, the North Caucasus region, and the Lower Volga region (specifically, in the Saratov area and in the Volga German Autonomous Republic) were the death tolls as high as in some regions of Ukraine. Comparative analyses of losses in different regions of Ukraine and Russia suggest that we may need to rethink some of our notions about the Holodomor.⁷

Finally, the third problem that becomes obvious after reading the book (the need for synthesis of the accumulated knowledge about the Holodomor) reveals itself through a

⁷ O. Rudnytskyi, N. Levchuk, O. Wolowyna, and P. Shevchuk. 1932–34 Famine Losses within the Context of the Soviet Union // Declan Curran, Lubomyr Luciuk, Andrew G. Newby (Eds.). *Famines in European Economic History: The Last Great European Famines Reconsidered*. New York, 2015. Pp. 192–222.

confusing multiplicity of the existing explanatory paradigms. Some of these may or may not contradict each other or be applicable only to particular cases, with certain methodological reservations. A systematic review of the state of the field is necessary. Such a review must clarify contradictions and test hypotheses with empirical evidence, and then organize all the results in a coherent model (or models) using certain conceptual frameworks. Such a synthesis will provide a clearer roadmap for future Holodomor research, which can be achieved only through an interdisciplinary collaboration of historians and demographers, combining qualitative analysis with statistical multivariate techniques.



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Andrea Graziosi, Lubomyr A. Hajda, and Halyna Hryn (Eds.), *After the Holodomor: The Enduring Impact of the Great Famine on Ukraine* [Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute Publications] (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013). 322 pp. ISBN: 978-1-932650-04-4.

Голодомор 1932–1933 гг. в УССР стал одной из самых трагических и страниц в истории украинцев. Точное количество его жертв ученые не могут установить до сих пор, что порождает все новые и новые научные дискуссии как среди украинских, так и иностранных исследователей. Почти в каждой украинской семье сегодня есть родственники, погибшие в 1932–1933 гг. С 2008 года в Украине на государственном уровне отмечается День памяти жертв голодоморов в последнюю субботу ноября. Каждый гражданин Украины считает своим долгом зажечь свечу, чтобы помянуть жертв Голодомора. Возвращение Голодомора в общественное сознание и публичную политику тесно связано с процессом научного изучения голода и его причин, которое, как свидетельствует рецензируемый сборник, выходит за рамки одной национальной историографии.

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