

Mykhailo Hrushevsky. *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. Volume 9, Book 2, Part 2. *The Cossack Age, 1654–1657*. Translated by Marta Daria Olynyk. Edited by Yaroslav Fedoruk and Frank E. Sysyn with the assistance of Myroslav Yurkevich. Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2010. lxxxvii, 480 pp. \$119.95 cloth.

Another volume of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's magisterial *History of Ukraine-Rus'* has become available thanks to the continuing efforts of the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. The previous installment in the series, volume nine, book 2, part 1 (2008) dealt with the crucial period 1654–55, when the collapse of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky's project to install his son Tymish as hospodar of Moldavia, the breakdown of his military alliance with the Crimean Tatars, and the new Tatar alliance with King Jan Kazimierz forced Khmelnytsky to negotiate with Moscow to place Ukraine under Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich's protection. The resulting Pereiaslav Agreement was of enormous consequence for the future of Ukraine because its terms and intent were left partly undefined and therefore subject to subsequent reinterpretation by both the hetman's ruling circle and the tsar's government. Hrushevsky thought that Aleksei was initially less interested in using the agreement to turn Ukraine into a Muscovite province than in using it to secure the Ukrainian Cossack army as allies in the war to recover Smolensk and annex Lithuanian Rus'. For his part Khmelnytsky initially believed that the agreement would compensate for his abandonment by the Crimean Tatars by establishing alliance with Muscovy, which he expected would help to secure the Orthodox faith in Ukraine without Ukraine's new "protectorate" status limiting his sovereignty or endangering the liberties of the Zaporozhian Host.

Volume nine, book 2, part 2 begins in June 1655 with the Swedish invasion of the Commonwealth and Bohdan Khmelnytsky's negotiation of a tentative alliance with Sweden at Kamianets. It concludes with his death in July 1657 and the political divisions within the Hetmanate that would soon elevate Ivan Vyhovsky. The focus throughout this volume is on the reasons for the growing estrangement of Ukraine from Muscovy and the preconditions for Hetman Vyhovsky's eventual repudiation of Muscovite protectorate and the Ukrainian Cossacks' re-alliance with Poland (the 1658 Treaty of Hadiach).

Although Moscow was intent on limiting his authority to conduct an independent foreign policy, Khmelnytsky initially believed his rapprochement with Karl X Gustav could provide a further guarantee to the Hetmanate's sovereignty without provoking a complete break with the tsar. Now that Jan Kazimierz had been driven from Warsaw and the Radziwiłłs had placed Lithuania under Swedish protection, Khmelnytsky thought that the Hetmanate could not only secure its independence from the Commonwealth once and for all, but also extend its territory to the north and west. Hence some Ukrainian Cossack forces in the west joined the Swedes and another new ally, the Transylvanian prince György II Rákóczi, for a final victory against the Polish king, while other Ukrainian forces joined the Muscovites in a drive upon Lviv.

Unfortunately for Khmelnytsky, Karl X and Rákóczi were never able to offer him guarantees on the Hetmanate's sovereignty and frontiers that was clear and firm enough to serve as a counterweight to the relationship the tsar expected from the Pereiaslav Agreement (p. 80). Meanwhile the conduct of the tsar's campaigns in Belarus' had taken a new turn: Moscow now gave greater urgency to asserting the tsar's sovereignty over the captured towns of Lithuania, including those taken by Ukrainian Cossack forces, lest these towns come under the formal sovereignty of the hetman. The Swedish king having now "revealed his intention of

taking power in Poland and Lithuania, the Muscovite government countered with its own claims to Lithuania, Belarus' and western Ukraine ... a manifestation of Muscovite plans to turn them into Muscovite provinces" (pp. 25–26). It was also clear that Moscow's preoccupation with territorial expansion in Belarus' left it unready to provide Ukraine with much military deterrent against the Crimean Tatars.

By October 1655 Khmelnytsky was forced to withdraw many of his troops from joint operations with the Muscovites and the Swedes and Hungarians in order to protect Ukraine from attack by the Crimean Tatars. The Crimean khan in turn used threats of Tatar invasion to try to turn Khmelnytsky back towards peace with Jan Kazimierz. Khmelnytsky was able to obtain a truce with the Tatars without having to make peace with the king or break with the tsar, but the disgrace and suicide of Vasilii Buturlin at year's end, for offenses that seemed "to amount to nothing terrible or substantial," made Ukrainian ruling circles more nervous about the political costs of the tsar's "protection": there was dismay that "such a great man, so recently lauded by the tsar himself for his merits in bringing Ukraine under Muscovite rule ... lost everything so easily and ended his life in vain as a suicide, without earning even a kind word from the tsar.... If such an end could befall one's own in that Muscovy, what could its newly arrived wards expect?" (p. 76).

Hrushevsky thinks pressure from the Crimean Tatars did play a role in convincing Polish and Lithuanian magnates and army hetmans to abandon the Swedes and assist Jan Kazimierz in recovering the throne. Karl X expected the Ukrainian Cossacks to continue in joint operations against the Poles, but it was more important to him at this time to tighten his alliance with Rákóczi. To this end he promised Lviv, Galicia, Pokuttia, and Podillia would be stripped from the defeated Commonwealth and awarded to Rákóczi rather than to the Hetmanate. These developments provided Jan Kazimierz the opening to send Jan Szumowski to the Crimean khan to urge a Tatar-Ukrainian rapprochement and bring Khmelnytsky to make peace with the king. Although Khmelnytsky was not yet prepared to accept, there was a party of Cossack colonels ready to throw off the tsar's "protection" and determine Ukraine's fate in league with Poland; but it was unable to prevail at the Rosava Council in May 1656 (136–37). For the time being Khmelnytsky's policy remained one of walking the tightrope, maintaining alliance with Muscovy while simultaneously maintaining "friendly expectation" towards Sweden and Rákóczi.

An important stage in the worsening of the Hetmanate's relations with Muscovy came in the summer of 1656. Although the Hetmanate had rejected at the Rosava Council negotiating peace with Jan Kazimierz, the Muscovites broke off relations with Sweden (May 1656), redeployed their armies to Livonia, and began peace talks with the Polish king (1 August 1656). This *volte-face* was encouraged by the Habsburg emperor and motivated partly by Tsar Aleksei's anxiety about Swedish encroachment on his conquests in Lithuania and by his belief the Poles would be willing to purchase peace at the price of agreeing to designate him heir to the Polish throne. Cossack representatives of the Hetmanate were not allowed to participate in the talks at Vilnius that produced an armistice settlement with the Commonwealth and initiated the tsar's war against Sweden. Khmelnytsky protested that past events—especially Polish persecution of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine—made it impossible for him to make peace with the Poles. It was also a shock that the terms Aleksei had set for peace with the Commonwealth reportedly included the cession to Muscovy of "White Rus', Volhynia, and Podilia ... as far as the Buh River, for all time," (p. 163) and required the Zaporozhian Cossacks "to unite into one state with the Commonwealth and ... forever belong to the Commonwealth" once the tsar was elected king of Poland and grand duke of Lithuania (p. 164).

The Muscovites were ultimately unable to obtain all these terms—the Poles were willing to agree only to an armistice and to the election of the tsar upon the death of Jan Kazimierz, and they still demanded the eventual return to the Commonwealth of Ukraine and Belarus'. Both sides accepted this compromise in order to concentrate their energies on the struggle against Sweden. But much of the Cossack *starshyna* was nonetheless outraged by the Vilnius talks: “Not only did the tsar’s envoys not consult with us about anything or admit us to the Polish tent, but they did not even allow us near the tent—just like dogs at God’s church. But the Liakhs, probably out of a guilty conscience, said that the tsar’s envoys concluded a settlement with the Liakh commissioners ... according to the Treaty of Polianovka, and we, the Zaporozhian Host with all of Little Rus', are again to be on the king’s side, with the Liakhs, the enemies of the Holy Cross” (p. 170).

The conviction that the tsar had betrayed Ukraine at Vilnius spread among the *starshyna*, marginalizing the pro-Muscovite faction. It complicated Ukrainian-Muscovite joint operations to partition Poland, and it led Khmelnytsky to seek a closer if still informal military alliance with Rákóczi and Karl X. For the time being the Swedish king was content to ask Khmelnytsky to send letters of admonishment to the tsar while dispatching 20,000 Cossacks to assist the Swedish army; he had not yet addressed the issues of the ultimate disposition of the Polish domains and the status of Ukraine. Khmelnytsky, for his part, wanted to avoid a complete break with Muscovy until the time the tsar tried to hand Ukraine over to the Commonwealth; he tried to convince Moscow his joint operations with Rákóczi were not in support of the prince’s ambitions but merely necessary retaliation for Polish attacks on Ukraine. In response to the Ukrainian-Swedish rapprochement, Polish diplomats stepped up their own efforts to negotiate a truce and restore Ukraine to the Commonwealth as an independent principality comprising the former palatinates of Kyiv and Chernihiv.

By 1657 Bohdan Khmelnytsky was deathly ill and preoccupied with getting his son Yurii recognized as his successor. Hrushevsky sees the Host as formally agreeing to this, proclaiming Yurii as hetman, and Bohdan as beginning to transfer powers to him: it was only after Bohdan’s death that Vyhovsky cast doubt on Yurii’s election and moved to get himself elected. In the late spring Ukrainian operations in support of Rákóczi at Sambir began falling apart, pushing Karl X to demand Khmelnytsky make a total break with Muscovy and join the Crimean Tatars against the Muscovites. But by July Karl X was forced to withdraw most of his own troops from Poland to respond to Denmark’s entry into the war; the disintegration of Rákóczi’s army in Poland had encouraged the Crimean Tatars to mass for attacks on Transylvania, the hospodarates, and Ukraine; and soon after this Karl X’s ally, the Prussian elector Friedrich Wilhelm, abandoned him and signed an alliance with Poland. This left Rákóczi isolated at Brest and the Ukrainian Cossacks now in open revolt against him.

In the summer the Muscovite envoy Fedor Buturlin arrived at Chyhyryn and sharply rebuked Bohdan Khmelnytsky for having broken his oath of “full obedience to His Tsarist Majesty” by rendering aid to his enemies, the king of Sweden and the prince of Transylvania (p. 343). Khmelnytsky responded that he done so “out of fear—because the Liakhs, offering great fantasies, actually told us under oath that His Tsarist Majesty had returned us to the Liakhs.... But we never wished and do not wish that they [Karl X and Rákóczi] take over the Kingdom of Poland—only that his Tsarist Majesty establish peace and concord with the Swede” (p. 347). Buturlin then demanded that Yurii Khmelnytsky affirm a new oath of loyalty to the tsar.

At this point Stanisław Bieniewski brought Bohdan Khmelnytsky a proposal for reconciliation with the Commonwealth, pointing out that this would be of great advantage to him

now that he faced renewed war with the Crimean Tatars and “no longer enjoys any trust with Muscovy” (371). This offer would serve as the foundation for Hetman Vyhovsky’s agreement to the Hadiach Treaty the following year. For the time being Bieniewski expected “the greatest care that Muscovy not be informed until all that has been concluded” (p. 371). Khmelnytsky did not commit to this, but his choices were narrowing. Rákóczi surrendered to the Poles in July, and the Cossack mutiny that had begun in Rákóczi’s army now spread to Yurii Khmelnytsky’s army, stationed at Korsun to defend against the Tatars. Bohdan Khmelnytsky died on 27 July 1657.

In his final chapter Hrushevsky offers an appraisal of Khmelnytsky’s character and political career and his significance for Ukraine’s history. He recognizes Khmelnytsky’s achievement as founder of the Hetmanate but does not view him as the ideal embodiment of Cossackdom or the Ukrainian national idea. He thinks that Khmelnytsky did not follow a logically unfolding general plan to build an independent Ukrainian nation, but remained committed to the idea of Cossack autonomy within the Commonwealth at least until 1649; that he did not anticipate the ultimate consequences of the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654; that his *de facto* alliance with Sweden in 1655 represented yet another great shift in objectives and strategy; and that it was likely Vyhovsky, not Khmelnytsky, who planned and directed diplomacy from 1651 on, scrambling in 1657–58 to find a new strategy to replace the one that had collapsed.

This volume includes two very useful essays by Yaroslav Fedoruk and Frank Sysyn placing Hrushevsky’s concluding assessment in updated historiographic context. They and the volume’s high-quality maps, glossary, and notes further enhance the value of Hrushevsky’s richly detailed account. Like the previous volumes in the series, this one is also an essential acquisition for every university library and every reader interested in early modern Ukrainian and Eastern European history.