

Mykhailo Hrushevsky. *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. Volume Nine, Book Two, Part One. *The Cossack Age, 1654–1657*. Translated by Marta Daria Olynyk. Edited by Serhii Plokyh and Frank E. Sysyn with the assistance of Myroslav Yurkevich. Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2008. lxvi, 566 pp. \$119.95 cloth.

One of the greatest achievements of Ukrainian historiography—indeed, of modern Ukrainian culture—was Mykhailo Hrushevsky's magisterial ten-volume history of Ukraine from the tenth century down to Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky's Hadiach Treaty (1658). These volumes were published in Ukrainian between 1898 and 1936 (the last appearing two years after the author's death in Caucasian exile). An eleventh volume taking the narrative to 1665 was rumoured to have been prepared but has not been found.

In terms of sweep, detail, and use of primary sources the four last volumes of Hrushevsky's *History*—the volumes dealing with sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Cossack Ukraine and the Hetmanate—remain the capital work on this period of Ukrainian history. Hrushevsky was very much a Rankean dedicated to thorough quarrying of the archives and close critical interrogation of the sources, which he often excerpted at length or reproduced in full. These included Polish as well as Ukrainian and Russian sources. Hrushevsky was therefore able to reconstruct high politics, warfare, and diplomacy in great detail. His attention to the unfolding of diplomatic missions and diplomatic correspondence allowed him to show how factional rivalries and sudden new exigencies pressed the great powers to alter their terms and even revise their strategic interests. The reader also learns much about the conduct of war because Hrushevsky quotes at length from commanders' reports, military memoirs, and prisoners' interrogations. And because hetmans Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky pursued such an imaginative and wide-ranging grand strategy, Hrushevsky's sources provide rich information

about Ukrainian relations not only with Muscovy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but also with most of the other powers of eastern Europe (Transylvania and the Danubian hospodarates, the Crimean Khanate, the Porte, Sweden). Those of us specializing in Muscovite or Ottoman history but not adept at reading Ukrainian have long been frustrated that Hrushevsky's *History* was of such obviously enormous value but remained largely inaccessible to us.

It is now becoming accessible. Since 1997 the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies has been publishing Hrushevsky's *History* in excellent English translation, with very useful introductory essays by Frank Sysyn and Serhii Plokyh, and good maps, and complete scholarly apparatus. So far have appeared volume One, dealing with the prehistory and early history of Kyivan Rus'; volume seven, examining the development of Ukrainian Cossackdom in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries; volume eight, on the Cossack Revolution and the formation of the Hetmanate; and the first two of the three parts of volume nine. The first part of volume nine, book one, covered the years 1650–53: the 1651 war with the Commonwealth; the battle of Berestechko and the Bila Tserkva Treaty; Bohdan Khmelnytsky's Moldavian project; and the death of Tymish Khmelnytsky.

Volume nine, book two, part one, covers the period from the autumn of 1653 to the summer of 1655. This is one of the most important junctures in Ukrainian history, marked by the negotiation of the Pereiaslav Agreement placing the Hetmanate under the tsar's protection, the collapse of the Hetmanate's military alliance with the Crimean Khanate, and the Hetmanate's involvement in Muscovy's new war with Poland-Lithuania.

In 1653 the collapse of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's project to install his son Tymish as *hospodar* of Moldavia undermined his alliance with Sultan Mehmet IV and Khan Ismail III Girei. The Crimean Tatars shifted their slave-raiding operations to the territory of the Hetmanate. King Jan Kazimierz refused to renegotiate peace with Khmelnytsky on the terms of the Zboriv Treaty, citing these Tatar attacks on Ukrainian villages and towns as proof that Khmelnytsky's alliance with the Tatars had been the act of a perjurer and renegade who had betrayed his own Christian faith (pp. 34–35). Although the king's army was not yet ready to attack Halych during its campaign against the Cossacks, Khmelnytsky could no longer count on the Crimean Tatars as allies against the Poles, for the Tatars now placed greater value on raiding opportunities in Ukraine than booty opportunities in Moldavia or against the Polish army (p. 59). At Zhvanets in December 1653, the khan's grand vizier, Sefer Ghazi Aga, negotiated an armistice with King Jan Kazimierz. The terms of armistice called upon the king to restore to the Zaporozhian Host the rights guaranteed it in the Zboriv Treaty, to resume tribute to the khan, and to permit the Tatars to take captives in Ukraine. It left unclear whether the khan would actively ally with the Poles against Khmelnytsky. But it made obvious that the Hetmanate's military alliance with the Crimean Tatars was over.

Khmelnytsky was therefore forced to step up his diplomacy with Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich and negotiate some kind of Muscovite protectorate over the Zaporozhian Host. For Khmelnytsky such an agreement of protectorate would compensate for the loss of his alliance with the khan; for the tsar it offered the prospect of military alliance with the Hetmanate to counter a Polish-Tatar alliance against Muscovy (p. 117). The trick for Khmelnytsky was how to negotiate a Muscovite protectorate without completely breaking off with the khan. Hrushevsky sees Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky clinging to the hope that "the khan should not enter into an alliance with the Polish king so as not to incur the tsar's wrath. In the event that the tsar ordered the hetman and the Zaporozhian Host to proceed against the Polish king, the

khan should proceed through the steppes against the Polish king, without touching the Cossack towns.... The alliance (friendship) of the khan and the hetman would thus remain strong” (p. 119). For the time being the negotiations with the Muscovites at Pereiaslav should be kept secret from the khan, as his *chambuly* were still roaming Ukraine.

Hrushevsky's discussion of the Pereiaslav negotiations occupies 139 pages. It is closely detailed, citing not only the surviving protocols (the “articles” redacted at Moscow) but also Khmelnytsky's and Vyhovsky's letters, the petitions of municipal delegations and monasteries, and even the alarmed reports of Polish and pro-Polish officials learning of the Pereiaslav Agreement. Hrushevsky examines in detail the terms of the protectorate agreement that would soon become problematic (the issue of Muscovite *voevody* and garrisons in the towns of the Hetmanate, which authority had the right to collect taxes, the hetman's rights to conduct his own diplomacy, etc.) and shows how understandings of these terms could be subject to change under later circumstances.

Hrushevsky emphasizes strategic concerns rather than any religious-ideological program of “reunification” as the main motive for the Pereiaslav negotiations: Khmelnytsky and Tsar Aleksei were both in immediate need of each other as military allies against the Commonwealth. He observes that Vyhovsky in particular encouraged the tsar to proceed with his war against the Commonwealth by suggesting that Lithuanian control over western Rus' was weakening and Muscovite recovery of Smolensk and Seversk was a quick and easy task, particularly with Khmelnytsky's Cossacks providing military assistance. Although Hrushevsky does not state it explicitly, the material he presents suggests the possibility that Aleksei was less interested in early 1654 in turning Ukraine into a Muscovite province than in recovering Smolensk and annexing Lithuanian-ruled Rus' with Khmelnytsky's support. The Muscovite invasion of Lithuania launched in May 1654 comprised three army groups totaling 71,000 troops and 4,000 guns, as well as 20,000 Ukrainian Cossacks under Colonel Ivan Zolotareno. By contrast, just 4,000 Muscovite troops were sent into Ukraine to supplement the two thousand already garrisoned at Kyiv. The tsar's military commitment to the defense of the Hetmanate would of course subsequently expand after the Crimean Tatars entered hostilities in alliance with the Poles (see my book *Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe* [London and New York: Routledge, 2007], 115, 117–119).

Hrushevsky believes that Khmelnytsky sought Muscovite military alliance and protection of the Orthodox faith in Ukraine but did not envision “protectorate” as limiting his sovereignty as hetman or circumscribing the liberties of the Zaporozhian Host. The words of Vasilii Buturlin, the Muscovite envoy at Pereiaslav, showed that the tsar accepted this image of protectorate but reserved for himself “a free hand in the further ordering of Ukrainian affairs” (p. 154). Hence Buturlin refused to give the tsar's self-binding oath but probably did give Khmelnytsky “a very decisive assurance of the tsar's word” (p. 161). Hrushevsky does consider Khmelnytsky guilty of “carelessness in his conversations with Buturlin and his associates in Pereiaslav concerning further relations ... thereby giving the Muscovite government advantages in those relations that he could easily have avoided if he had reckoned more with the use that Muscovy could make of them” (p. 162).

Khmelnytsky's carelessness was in regard to two crucial matters. The first of these was military: he (and the Muscovites as well) had not given sufficient thought to how Moscow's role in protecting Ukraine might change in the event the Crimean Khanate allied with the Poles against them and the tsar got bogged down in his campaigns in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. (The expansion of the war on Ukrainian territory would inevitably give Moscow more reason to enlarge and multiply its garrisons and intervene more directly in the collection

of taxes). The second matter initially had to do with political ritual, and its significance would become apparent only over time: Khmelnytsky had not foreseen that the tsar's envoys would fan out across Ukraine collecting oaths of allegiance to the tsar and receiving petitions of submission from various towns (e.g., Pereiaslav, Kyiv, Nizhen, Chernihiv), and there was nothing he could do about it. Hrushevsky explains: "Everything in Ukraine had been conquered by the Cossack sword. And when the time was at hand, Muscovy accepted Cossack Ukraine, which the Cossack Host was submitting to it, without asking anyone else. Even when they arrived in Ukraine to establish new relations, the Muscovite envoys did not think it necessary, even for the sake of appearances, to convene any assembly of representatives of the Ukrainian estates.... The hetman and the Cossack officers had sworn an oath, which meant that everyone else had to swear; otherwise it would be a revolt against Cossack authority and Cossack law. But the Cossack leaders, not having taken care to develop a theoretical system of Cossack law, also neglected to bind that system to another political principle that they themselves had advanced and championed from time to time with the Polish government: the principle of the inviolability of the rights of the Rus' nation and all its estates and institutions, both clerical and secular.... At the midnight hour of this critical era, during the Pereiaslav negotiations, the Cossack elite took no care whatever to establish in law its Cossack hegemony—the patronage and authority of the Cossack Host over the other strata of Ukraine and their institutions!" (p. 241)

The rest of this volume describes how news of the Pereiaslav Agreement pushed the Polish king and the new Crimean khan, Mehmet IV Girei, to form a new military alliance for war against both Muscovy and the Hetmanate. The Ottoman sultan was not prepared to restrain the khan from this, as he feared Don Cossack and Zaporozhian Cossack naval raids on his coastal towns at this critical juncture in his war with Venice. There were even reports from Moldavia that crossing points on the Danube were being established for the Ottoman army. Much of the Cossack army was off in Seversk with Zolotareno, and there were already sharp disagreements between Zolotareno and the Muscovite commanders as to where the Cossacks were to campaign and whether they would be permitted to take the surrender of towns in the Lithuanian duchy. The final chapter makes a digression to summarize the state of economic and cultural life in Ukraine as described by Archdeacon Paul of Aleppo, who accompanied his father, Patriarch Makarios III of Antioch, in a journey across Ukraine in 1654. It then shifts to the enormous destruction in the spring of 1655 wrought by the Polish invasion of Ukraine, led by Stefan Czarniecki, Stanisław Potocki, and Stanisław Lanckoroński, and describes Khmelnytsky's pleas for reinforcement with Muscovite troops under V. B. Sheremetev.

Given the continuing controversy over the meaning of the Pereiaslav Agreement, this is one of the most important volumes in Hrushevsky's magnum opus. This English-language edition includes a very useful introductory essay by Serhii Plokhly describing the development of Hrushevsky's political and historical views and assessing the place of his work in Ukrainian and Russian historiography.

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