

Review Article

1654 and All That in 2004

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- Oleh O. Rafalsky. *Pereiaslavskiyi dohovir Ukrainy z Rosiieiu 1654 roku: Retrospektyvnyi analiz*. Kyiv: Heneza, 2004. 294 pp.
- Pavlo Sokhan et al., eds. *Pereiaslavska rada 1654 roku: Istoriohrafiiia ta doslidzhennia*. Kyiv: Smolyskyp, 2003. xx, 885 pp.
- Oleksandr I. Hurzhii and Taras V. Chukhlib, eds. *Pereiaslavska rada ochyma istorykiv, movoiu dokumentiv*. Kyiv: Ukraina, 2003. 430 pp.
- Iurii Shapoval, ed. *Petro Shelest: "Spravzhnii sud istorii shche poperedu": Spohady, shchodennyky, dokumenty, materialy*. Kyiv: Heneza, 2003. 807 pp.
- Viktor F. Andriienko et al. *Volodymyr Shcherbytsky: Spohady suchasnykiv*. Ed. V.I. Kyiashko. Kyiv: In Iure, 2003. 587 pp.
- Andrzej Gil. *Dekret prezydenta Leonida Kuczmy o obchodach 350 rocznicy Kozackiej Rady Perejaslawskiej 1654 r., i jego znaczenie dla wewnetrznej i zewnetrznej sytuacji Ukrainy*. Lublin: Instytut Europy Srodkowo-Wschodniej, 2003. 60 pp.

The 1654 Treaty of Pereiaslav seemed fated to go the way of other early-modern treaties. Many on both sides opposed it. Within a few years after having proclaimed it eternal, both signatories contravened its stipulations: one declared it null and void, and then both declared war on each other. Bohdan Khmelnytsky actually hid and never disseminated his copy of the treaty, while the Council of Officers did not ratify it. In 1659 Russian envoys gave the document a new lease on life when they alleged that the more restrictive terms they had drawn up that year for a Ukrainian delegation to sign were the terms of 1654. Fifty years later Peter I learned

that the original document had disappeared and by 1789 Cossack Ukraine, the territory to which the treaty referred, also disappeared. The treaty became legally relevant once more at the turn of the nineteenth century in connection with talks about Finnish and Polish autonomy and then again in 1917.

In 1904 the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party published two postcards commemorating the 250th anniversary of the treaty, which graphically condemned it as the beginning of Ukraine's enslavement.¹ The party's activists formed the first Ukrainian terrorist organization, Defense of Ukraine, and tried to blow up Pushkin's statue in Kharkiv to protest the anniversary. On 18 January that year Panas Saksahansky's Ukrainian troupe staged a Sunday evening performance of *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* at the Bergoli theatre in Kyiv. Kyiv newspapers mention no other public commemorations.² In 1914, at the Kadet party's annual conference, Mykhailo Hrushevsky referred to the treaty as a model, but that year national leaders devoted their energies to the centennial of Taras Shevchenko's birth, not to the anniversary of the Pereiaslav Council. Between 1917 and 1921 Ukrainian governments and political groups commemorated the events of 1654 as they saw fit. An article in Nestor Makhno's newspaper *Shliakh do voli* (27 November 1919) explained that his followers were not concerned with what one dictator, Khmelnytsky, did with another dictator, Tsar Aleksei in 1654. Their "ex-slaves," who were free now, embraced the motto "death to all exploiters." In the 1930s Mikhail Pokrovsky's criticism of Khmelnytsky was reflected in the huge grey shroud that concealed the hetman's statue in front of St. Sophia Cathedral during Soviet holiday celebrations. The Soviet regime officially celebrated the treaty for the first time only in 1944, on Nikita Khrushchev's recommendation. In 1954, on the treaty's 300th anniversary, Communist Party officials and historians gave it yet another lease on life as the basis of an official interpretation of history that stressed Ukrainian-

1. M. Zabochen, O. Polishchuk, and V. Iatsuk, *Na spomyn ridnoho kraiu: Ukraina u starii lystivtsi* (Kyiv: Krynytsia, 2000), 207. The drawings by the Eastern Ukrainian Vasyl Riznychenko were published under a pseudonym in Austrian-ruled Galicia. One depicts a snickering Tsar Aleksei holding chains and the other Peter I beating a Ukrainian woman with his sceptre.

2. *Kievlianin*, *Kievskaiia gazeta*, and *Kievskoe slovo* carried no related articles or even a review of the play. The Lviv newspaper *Dilo* ran lead articles on the treaty as Ukraine's tragedy and how Galician Polish newspapers presented the issue (15 [28] and 17 [30] January 1904).

Russian similarities and how Ukraine benefited from political association with Russia. In a “thesis” proclaimed that year an anonymous group of mostly Ukrainian historians headed by Andrii Lykholat depicted the treaty as a voluntary reunion of two fraternal nations. For the next thirty-seven years millions of students throughout the USSR were taught only this particular interpretation of the past.

Eleven years after independence, in March 2002, President Kuchma called for the commemoration of the treaty that marked the beginning of Russian rule in Ukraine. In January 2004 he sat alongside Russia’s president at a gala concert in Kyiv celebrating the Treaty of Pereiaslav. Outside, protesters shouted “Putin go home,” while others demonstrated nearby in support of “Ukrainian-Russian reunion.” On New Year’s Day 2004, either by accident or intent, Verka Serdiuchka dominated all Russian and Ukrainian television programs and polled unprecedented high ratings.³ This character, invented by Poltava-born Andrii Danylko, has pop-cult status in Russia and eastern Ukraine. Verka, a naïve, simpleminded woman, sings and speaks in *surzhyk* (a Russian-Ukrainian patois) in a Russian version of the old American minstrel shows. This burlesque character represents a Soviet-type “Little Russian” that audiences find hilarious and some critics condemn as a demeaning stereotype that panders to and reinforces Russian anti-Ukrainian preconceptions.

The treaty’s anniversary spawned a number of books and articles dealing with Ukrainian-Russian relations, six of which are reviewed here. Four cover the events of 1654, their significance and interpretation. Two others deal with the last two representatives of the long line of Ukrainian collaborationist leaders that followed the treaty. Together, these books provide insight into the impact of the Russian legacy in Ukraine, the thinking of the country’s neo-Soviet political leaders, and the politics of collaboration, historiography, and commemorations.

The book by Rafalsky, a functionary of the Presidential Administration, is a lame attempt to use the legacy the 1654 agreement to justify Kuchma’s pro-Russian neo-Soviet policies. The author claims that, because the consequences of the treaty were both unforeseen and unfortunate for Ukraine, Ukrainians today must remember it as their government enters into a new relationship with Russia. Rafalsky pays

3. *Izvestiia*, 10 January 2004; *Den*, 10 January 2004.

little attention to Poland and the European Union and instead sees a future Ukraine as the third member of an anti-European, anti-Asian, Russian-Belarusian “Rus’ alliance.” President Kuchma’s pursuit of this objective, meanwhile, supposedly makes his foreign policy much like Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s (p. 186)! In a ridiculous attempt to attach patriotic patina to this desired “alliance,” he misrepresents and cites out of context a reference to such a possibility made by the Ukrainian conservative thinker Viacheslav Lypinsky (pp. 188, 199–201). Instead of concluding that people who get burned should not put their fingers into the fire again, Rafalsky claims that past experience will lead Ukrainians to build a better relationship with Russia, similar to that which exists between Canada and the United States (p. 196). He seems to be oblivious to Canada’s economic, cultural, and, some argue, even political dependency on the United States, a dependency some call neo-colonialism. Rafalsky includes the 1997 Ukrainian-Russian cooperation treaty in his appendix of twelve documents and approvingly notes that, because Russia ratified it in 1999, Ukraine “did not lean westwards.” Then he briefly summarizes the liberal attitudes of Kyiv and Moscow on national issues and claims that the political role of post-imperial nationalism is declining in both countries (p. 194). He does not mention how much of Ukraine’s economy and mass media is owned by Russian companies or that Russia and Ukraine both have approximately twelve million of the other’s nationals in their countries. Nor does he consider that although Kyiv spends millions if not billions of *karbovantsi* providing for the cultural needs of its Russian-speaking citizens, who in addition enjoy the Russian-language audio-visual products produced by Russian corporations in Russia and Ukraine, Moscow has yet to spend anything on its Ukrainian-speaking citizens, who have little or no access to privately produced Ukrainian-language audio-visual products. “The Year of Ukraine in Russia” came and went in 2003 with not one of Russia’s Ukrainian organizations receiving a kopeck of government money, not to mention access to government radio and television. In his conclusion, Rafalsky approvingly quotes Kuchma, who wrote that in 1654 Russia represented the only realistic option for Ukrainians: better to be Russian serfs than Turkish slaves, he claimed (p. 208). Today, however, ex-Turkish slaves are next in line to join the European Union, while fifteen years after independence Ukrainian is still not spoken in Kyiv’s streets. How many years after independence did residents of Athens and Sofia continue to speak Turkish?

At an official government-sponsored international conference held in February 2004 in Pereiaslav, most speakers were critical of the treaty and its consequences for Ukraine.⁴ The opposite view dominated the first Congress of the Slavic Peoples of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus held in Zaporizhzhia in May. In an unsigned statement published two years earlier this shadowy organization declared that it sought to recreate the political and religious unity of the Eastern Slavs within a common financial and economic complex.⁵ The Zaporizhzhia Oblast governor and local business oligarchs, in particular, the notorious local Ukrainophobe Viacheslav Boguslaev, sponsored the conference, which was attended by the Russian patriarch. The meeting opened with official greetings from the Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian governments. F. Muravchenko's long speech on the "Jewish-Masonic threat" to the Slavs received repeated thunderous ovations.⁶ Spokesmen called for the integration of the three participating nations and announced the group's intention to back a suitable candidate in the upcoming presidential election in Ukraine. The group got less media coverage than it perhaps expected, however. The day before the conference opening, Ruslana returned to Kyiv and, according to Agence France-Presse, "Ukraine went nuts." Contracted to the recording giant EMI, Ruslana, previously ignored by Ukrainian radio and television and unknown in Russia, had just won the Eurovision song contest. As of November her "Wild Dances" album had legally sold over 250,000 copies in Ukraine alone.⁷

350 years ago dynastic monarchy was a fundamental institution and nations were defined by princes and generals. So when a consecrated

4. M.T. Tovkailo, ed., *Pereiaslavska Rada: Istorychne znachennia ta politychni naslidky* (Kyiv, Prosvita, 2003). See also V.A. Smolii, et al., *Ukraina ta Rosiia: Problemy politychnykh i sotsiokulturnykh vidnosyn* (Kyiv: Instytut istorii NAN Ukrainy, 2003). R.P. Ivanchenko-Ivanova, ed., *Uroky Pereiaslava: Do 350-richchia Moskovsko-Pereiaslavskoi uhody* (Kyiv, 2004) is a collection of critical essays written primarily by university students.

5. "Zaiavlenie sezda slavianskikh narodov Belarusi, Rossii i Ukrainy," *Molodaia gvardiia*, 2002, no. 3: 205–8.

6. "Slavianskii sobor — v stolitse kazachestva," *Industrialnoe Zaporozhe*, 11 May 2004. I am grateful to Fedir Turchenko and Volodymyr Kravchenko for this information. On Boguslaev's dubious activities in support of Yanukovych's candidacy during the presidential elections, see <<http://www.maidan.org.ua/static/news/1101422602.html>> and <<http://www.maidan.org.ua/static/news/1101824923.html>>.

7. Audio and video at <<http://www.keithm.utvinternet.ie/Winners.htm>>.

legitimate ruler in 1654 duly recognized a man with a sword as leader of Cossack Ukraine, the country formally became part of the seventeenth-century European political map. Today nations are defined by pop stars and rock divas, and the Eurovision Song Contest, with an estimated 500 million viewers, represents one of Europe's new fundamental institutions. So when a woman with a microphone won first prize in 2004 she took what can be seen in hindsight as the first step in making her newly independent country part of the twenty-first-century European consciousness. The second step occurred in April when the Ukrainian boxer Vitalii Klichko won the world heavyweight title. The third step took place seven months later when hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians wearing orange colours peacefully showed their support for Viktor Yushchenko.

Russian capital controls or owns as much as eighty percent of Ukraine's economy while Ukrainian-born neo-Soviet Russophile oligarchs control approximately ninety percent of its communications network, a fact that explains why Russian still predominates in Ukraine's media. At least half of the country's Orthodox faithful are subject to the Russian patriarch in Moscow, not to the Ukrainian patriarch in Kyiv, and Kuchma allowed clergy who formally owe allegiance to a foreign national and do not recognize the existence of a Ukrainian nationality to teach religion in government ministries and serve as chaplains in the army. In an encyclopedia sponsored by the Russian Orthodox Church the entry for Little Russia (*Malorossiiia*) explains that "Ukrainian" is a term invented by "Russia's enemies" and popularized after 1917 by "Jewish Bolsheviks." The entry for the Pereiaslav Council says that it "reunified the Russian nation."⁸

Against this background many condemned Kuchma's intention to commemorate the 350th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Treaty as an attempt to justify and celebrate Ukrainian dependency on Russia by reanimating the "thesis." Later events seemed only to confirm apprehensions about the intentions of Russia and Ukraine's neo-Soviet Russophile elite. In April 2004 the government took Ukraine into the Russian-dominated Single Economic Space, and in May a "New Iron Curtain" descended on the Polish-Ukrainian border. Throughout the year Putin paid

8. O.A. Platonov, ed., *Sviataia Rus': Bolshaia entsiklopediia russkago naroda*, vol. 3, *Russkoe gosudarstvo* (Moscow: Pravoslavnoe izdatelstvo, 2002), 481, 613. The entry on Ukraine explains that the name is intended "to Polonize and Germanize the Russian people" (829).

official visits to Ukraine, business leaders called for more Ukrainian-Russian joint ventures, the volume of Ukrainian-Russian bilateral trade increased substantially, and Kuchma called for an eastward reorientation of foreign policy. The role of Russian financing and “political technicians” in Ukraine’s presidential election hearkened to the nefarious activities of Russian envoys in 1654. Whereas the former added the dead to voting lists and then used them to pad returns in favour of Yanukovich, the latter travelled the country enrolling the dead on lists of the tsar’s sworn subjects. Yanukovich’s dealings with Putin before the presidential elections brought to mind Hetman Briukhovetsky’s discussions with Tsar Aleksei in 1665.

In reaction to the government’s initiative to celebrate 1654 some historians refused to do anything at all on the grounds that even a critical public discussion of the treaty would legitimize its commemoration. After all, the only bad publicity is no publicity. Others, spearheaded by the Archeographical Institute at the Academy of Sciences, organized “counter-conferences.”⁹ Some historians from this group compiled *Pereiaslavska rada 1654 roku*. Funded in part by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies and released just before the planned celebrations, this collection of almost a thousand pages was published in 5,000 copies in a country where specialized academic studies rarely exceed 2,000 copies. Part 1 contains previously published articles that are critical of the treaty and tsarist and Soviet interpretations of it. Some of these articles are bibliographical rarities. Particularly valuable are the analytical studies by Hrushevsky, Oleksander Ohloblyn, Andrii Iakovliv, and Mykhailo Braichevsky. Six articles in part 2 summarize most of the Russian-, Ukrainian-, Polish-, and English-language historiography on the treaty and another five examine related events. The book shows that, despite differences over details, modern historians of the treaty belong to one of two groups. The first, which includes most, but not all, Russian historians, depicts the treaty as an expression of religious and/or national “forces” that drove the two Orthodox peoples with similar languages and customs into union or reunion in a single state and that in the long run this benefited both sides. The second group, which consists mostly, but

9. For a list of conferences and publications initiated by national-democrats, see Ia. Fedoruk, “Diialnist orhkomitetu konferentsii ‘Pereiaslavska rada 1654 r.,’ (vybrana bibliohrafiia vidhukiv),” *Moloda Ukraina*, 2005, no. 1: 299–319. Conspicuously absent from this initiative was the Institute of History under Valerii Smolii.

not only, of Ukrainians, depicts the treaty as a political event that reflected the interests of the two signatories. Its long-term costs outweighed its short-term benefits as it had negative consequences for Ukraine. The latter view was echoed in an authoritative full-page newspaper article released at the end of January by Ukraine's National Institute of Strategic Research.¹⁰

Although there is a free consensus of Ukrainian historians on the latter view, it is not shared by the entire population. Among some “the imperial and Soviet variants of the pan-Russian (Eastern Slavic) interpretation [persist]. Their major representatives are primarily social activists, left inclined politicians, and more than a few history teachers, whom the local party-ideological activists in Soviet times regarded as their reserve” (p. 519). The idea that the Pereiaslav Treaty represented “Russian-Ukrainian unity” is a product of tsarist historiography. It was reiterated in the 1954 CPSU “thesis” and still lingers today. Schools in Russia still teach this idea and Russians can still declare publicly without fear of ridicule that there are no differences between Ukrainians and Russians and that their two countries should “reunite.”¹¹

Perhaps because the editors had less than two years to compile this necessary and important anthology they could not produce a definitive book on the subject. *Pereiaslavska rada* has no bibliography, no examination of popular memory about 1654, and no history of the treaty's commemorations. Articles overlap. Ukrainian-language articles cite English-language items not in the article devoted to English-language historiography, and there is no chapter on French-, German-, and Latin-language historiography. While the editors briefly note the importance of the political-intellectual context (pp. vii–x), not all of the authors in part 2 devote sufficient attention to it. No one examines the interrelationship between Russian historians of the Juridical School, who, in the twenty years before the revolution, produced some of the best scholarship on Pereiaslav, and the need of tsarist officials and Russian political leaders

10. A. Halchynsky, et al., “Uhoda 1654 roku: Istorychni uroky dlia ukrainskoho narodu,” *Den*, 31 January 2004; also published separately as *Pereiaslavska uhoda 1654 roku: Istorychni uroky dlia ukrainskoho narodu* (Kyiv: Natsionalnyi instytut stratehichnykh doslidzhen, 2004).

11. Russian anti-Ukrainian opinion is summarized and discussed in O.P. Lanovenko, ed., *Ukraina-Rosiia: Kontseptualni osnovy humanitarnykh vidnosyn* (Kyiv: Stylos, 2001), 264–318, 340–70.

at the time to deal with Polish, Finnish, and Ukrainian national demands. Finally, the book has no analysis of the 1954 CPSU “thesis,” nor does it mention the role of Ukrainian Soviet historians in formulating it. Three relevant studies are not noted: my “The Origins of the Soviet Interpretation of Eastern Slavic History. A Case Study in Policy Formulation,” in *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 46 (1990): 221–53; Natalia Iusova, “Henezha kontseptu ‘davnoruska narodnist’ u radianskii istorychnii nauksi,” *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2001, no. 6: 65–85; and Serhy Yekelchuk, *Stalin’s Empire of Memory: Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet Historical Imagination* (2004), which is based on his 2000 doctoral dissertation and was in press when the collection was being compiled. Iurii Mytsyk’s seminal study, “Dovkola ‘arkhivu Pereiaslavskoi rady’: Mify ta realii dzherelnoi bazy,” inexplicably appears separately in *Arkhiv Ukrainy*, 2003, nos. 4–6: 11–23.

The second anthology, *Pereiaslavska rada ochyma istorykiv, movoiu dokumentiv* includes fifteen previously published documents relating to the treaty, excerpts about it from five seventeenth- and eighteenth-century chronicles, and sixteen articles by modern historians. All but two of the articles and excerpts are shortened, and four (Viacheslav Lypynsky, Hrushevsky, Braichevsky, and Rostyslav Lashchenko) appear also in the preceding anthology. Unlike that anthology, this one contains two examples of non-nationalist Russian treatments of the subject (Venedikt Miakotin and Rozenfeld). The editors’ explicit purpose was to popularize the Ukrainian national interpretation of the Pereiaslav Treaty and to counter the imperial and Soviet interpretation of the treaty as an “eternal reunion,” which is current in Ukraine today (p. 18).

Particularly useful in this collection are the articles by Iurii Mytsyk, Olena Apanovych, and Volodymyr Horobets, which show how Muscovite and Ukrainian interests began to diverge within months of the signing of the treaty, as each side realized it was getting more than it had bargained for. Also noteworthy is the editors’ dating of the transformation of the Pereiaslav Treaty from political act to historical myth. The turning point came in 1659, two years after Khmelnytsky had died. In their attempt to legitimize the restrictive conditions, which amounted to annexation, they had imposed on his son that year, the Muscovite envoys claimed that the new terms were those of 1654 and they published the 1659 terms as a booklet for broader dissemination (p. 18). The editors might have added that, although the idea of the Pereiaslav Treaty as an Eastern Slavic “reunion” can be found in written documents from the second half of the

seventeenth century, it appeared rarely. Originating among pro-Russian Ukrainian Muscophile clerics and pro-Ukrainian Russian Graecophiles who defended the Ukrainian-Russian alliance against its opponents in Moscow, Kyiv, and Chyhyryn, the reunion idea, like the word “eternal,” was a rhetorical device rather than a part of a legitimizing theory that motivated action. The notion of reunion entered Russian national historiography in the nineteenth century, but the editors are guilty of oversimplification when they claim that it was formulated on government orders (p. 18).

Poland was Cossack Ukraine’s major enemy 350 years ago. In November 1654 Polish armies under Stefan Czarniecki conducted a savage campaign in Ukraine. Today the Polish government is one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters. In November 2004 it was the first European government to reject the falsified election returns and Lech Wałęsa came to Kyiv to show his support for Viktor Yushchenko. Poland has more centres of Ukrainian studies than any other country in the world and Polish *ukrainoznawstwo* is second to none. During the 1990s Polish scholars published more academic books about Ukraine than Ukrainian scholars and this despite the fact that the average Pole regards Ukrainians in much the same terms as the average German sees Poles.¹² It should not be surprising, therefore, that a Polish scholar wrote a succinct and useful analysis of the events associated with 1654 and 2004.¹³

Gil begins with theoretical observations concerning the difficulty faced by new governments ruling societies without a single shared identity in choosing events to commemorate. He describes the events and interpretations of the Pereiaslav Treaty and then summarizes reactions to the government’s decision to commemorate it. He observes that in 1996 Kuchma declared that in his mind the treaty is associated with Ukrainian independence. In the same speech Kuchma also recognized that tsarist policy was directed at “destroying the Ukrainian state and turning it into a Russian imperial colony.”¹⁴ It could be argued, therefore, that the government intended to use the anniversary to buttress the idea of

12. The majority in both countries is either hostile or indifferent towards their eastern neighbours. (L. Kolarska-Bobińska, ed., *Obraz Polski i Polaków w Europie* [Warsaw: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2003], 211, 214, 287, 295).

13. See also his “Pereiaslavska rada 1654 roku ta ii vplyv na suchasnu Ukrainu,” *Moloda natsiia: Almanakh*, no. 3 (2003): 15–39.

14. L. Kuchma, “Dopovid na urochystykh zborakh z nahody 400-richchia vid dnia narodzhennia Bohdana Khmelnytskoho,” *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1996, no. 4: 9.

Ukrainian independence. Nonetheless, Gil continues, that is not how many would understand the initiative. Those with pan-Russian or Eastern Slavic sympathies would interpret the commemoration as an official confirmation of their pro-Russian attitudes. Western Ukrainian (Uniate) Catholics could take exception to an official national celebration of an anti-Uniate social group (Cossacks) that had never inhabited their territories. Then Gil speculates that these diverse reactions could accent divisions within Ukraine, re-animate latent anti-Polish sentiments and even sour the country's relations with Poland (pp. 37, 48–9). Fortunately, he was wrong, as ceremonies and reactions were muted. Planned events for 2004 did not include a commemoration of the 435th anniversary of the 1569 Union of Lublin, which, Gil mistakenly thinks, Ukrainians, like Poles, consider a model of national co-existence (p. 51), nor of the 345th anniversary of the 1659 Hadiach Treaty, which made Cossack Ukraine the third part of a confederated Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. I have been unable to determine whether Ukraine sent official greetings to Poland in connection with the 210th anniversary of Kosciuszko's unsuccessful revolt against the Russians. There is no indication that the Kuchma-Medvedchuk government sent greetings to Moscow on the anniversary of the Russian victory: presumably, official neo-Soviet Ukrainian Russophilism has limits.

Ukraine's political history from 1659 to 1991 involved collaborationist elites. Marxists labeled such people in Third World colonies "comprador bourgeoisie." Exiled opponents who regarded any form of service under foreign rule as treason, denounced such collaborators as careerists, sycophants, and traitors. Analysts and historians, who are more tolerant of those not prepared to suffer exile, unemployment, or imprisonment in the name of abstract ideals distinguish types of collaboration. In Ukraine, men like Ivan Briukhovetsky and Pavlo Sudoplatov, for whom the interests and commands of the centre overrode all local concerns and who obeyed above and beyond the demands of self-interest or pragmatism, exemplify one type. Figures like Pavlo Polubotok and Mykola Skrypnyk represent another type. Occupying a grey middle ground, to the disgust of the exiled opponents of Russian rule, and never fully trusted by their Russian overlords, they tried to reconcile local interests with orders from the centre.

Had the Communists been defeated and subsequently executed or exiled, the post-1991 government would not have preserved symbols and memories of the country's Russian and Soviet connection, like the Pereiaslav Treaty, in Ukraine's national legacy. In all probability the government would have ignored what happened in 1654. But in 1989 old

collaborationist administrators became rulers and, as Mykola Riabchuk observed, one of their political survival tactics was to sponsor a “post-Communist eclecticism” in public commemorations; an amalgam of selected Soviet and non-Soviet events and persons, many of which were previously considered incompatible. The problem Ukraine’s neo-Soviet leaders faced was common enough, although their solution was not, as can be illustrated by the example of Ireland.

The two fundamental acts that defined Ireland’s subordination to England were the Treaty of Windsor (1125) and the Act of Union (1801). The Anglo-Irish Treaty (1921) established the Irish Free State, but nationalists then fought a civil war over the terms of settlement. The republic’s second president, William Cosgrave, represented the moderates and was not very popular. Satirists caricatured him as a British lackey, and he tolerated official Irish presence at British commemorations of the dead of the First World War in London, which the nationalists boycotted as symbols of imperialism. But it is difficult to imagine that Cosgrave, had he remained in office long enough, would have issued a formal statement in 1925 or 1931 on commemorating the 800th or 130th anniversary of the mentioned agreements, proclaimed a year of Anglo-Irish friendship, or attended a gala concert in Dublin with the British prime minister. During the first decades of the Irish Free State the political leaders realized that, because their respective factions drew legitimacy from rival interpretations of history, all commemorations would be tainted by politics and would be counterproductive. Accordingly, they were cautious in officially commemorating events and persons. When they did commemorate something it would be a shared episode that would reconcile all parties.¹⁵

Will Kuchma’s selection of events and persons for commemoration reconcile the opposed sides? The celebrated events and persons ostensibly balanced the pro-Russian or pro-Soviet sympathies of some of the population with the anti-Soviet national sympathies of others: the Year of Russia in Ukraine was offset by the commemoration of the 1933 Famine.¹⁶ The

15. D. Fitzpatrick, “Commemoration in the Irish Free State,” in *History and Memory in Modern Ireland*, ed. I. McBride (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 203. For a social analysis of official commemorations, see W.M. Johnston, *Celebrations: The Cult of Anniversaries in Europe and the United States Today* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1991).

16. Only future historians will be able to tell us if those who organized the Year of

government did not impose an “official interpretation” and allowed teachers to teach the interpretation of Pereiaslav accepted by Ukrainian historians. It built statues to Hrushevsky, but did not demolish those to Lenin. The government did not officially commemorate the 750th anniversary of the crowning of King Danylo of Halych (in 2003), the seventieth anniversary of Mykola Skrypnyk’s death (in 2003), the 125th anniversary of Symon Petliura’s birth (in 2004), or the 85th anniversary of the founding of the Ukrainian SSR (in 2004).¹⁷ On 22 January 2004 it officially commemorated the 85th anniversary of the union of Western and Eastern Ukraine into a single state, but that same day government-run television broadcast a sympathetic documentary about Lenin. In June 2004 the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian presidents attended the Soviet-era Youth Friendship Day Festival in Chernihiv Oblast and laid wreaths to commemorate the “victims of fascism.” They did not commemorate the “victims of communism.” A book on the Second World War came out in two different versions: in one the introduction explicitly states that, contrary to the opinion of some people, the editors consider OUN-UPA members hired collaborators of Nazi Germany.¹⁸ In the other, these sentences do not appear. Yanukovich sent official greetings to the Slavic peoples meeting in Zaporizhzhia. Four years ago, as head of Donetsk Oblast, he wrote an introduction to a local history of the Soviet secret police (Cheka-NKVD-KGB) in which he praised these organizations for defending “our nation’s interests” and for “faithful service to Ukraine’s state and people.”¹⁹ In 2003 the government celebrated the 85th anniversary of Volodymyr Shcherbytsky’s birth. It named a street in Dnipropetrovsk after him and placed his grave on the main avenue at Baikove Cemetery, thus inducting him into the new national pantheon. It did

Russia in Ukraine in 2003 hoped to distract public attention from the seventieth anniversary of the 1933 Famine. The “Year of Russia” web-site (www.russia.org.ua) does not even have a passing reference to the Famine. It includes a number of surveys designed to indicate popular sympathy for Russia.

17. The Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic was proclaimed in January 1919. Until then the Bolsheviks in Moscow formally considered the Bolsheviks in Kharkiv as the “legitimate” government of the Ukrainian National Republic, which they recognized, not as leaders of a different territorial unit that did not include the Donbas, Crimea, or the northern Black Sea coast.

18. I.O. Herasymov et al., eds., *Bezsmertia: Knyha pamiati Ukrainy 1941–1945* (Kyiv: Knyha Pamiati Ukrainy, 2000), 8.

19. V. Zuev and I. Kulaha, *Orhany derzhavnoi bezpeky v Donetskii oblasti* (Donetsk, 2000).

not celebrate the 95th anniversary of Petro Shelest's birth. In short, although Ukraine's neo-Soviet authorities do commemorate select non-Soviet and non-Russian aspects of the past, the past they favour is represented by Soviet-era collaborators of the Briukhovetsky-Sudoplatov tradition.

A few months after the Shcherbytsky anniversary celebration, Iurii Shapoval's anthology on Shelest appeared. Published in 2,000 copies, the book is invaluable to historians of Ukraine and Soviet politics. It has three parts. The first contains Shelest's complete memoirs and diary, which supercedes the shorter Russian edition of 1995. The second part contains a selection of eighty-one previously unpublished documents from the years 1964 through 1973 and the official condemnation of Shelest's book *Ukraino nasha radianska*. Part three contains a series of interviews with and about Shelest. This anthology provides insights into important events in Ukraine during the 1960s, as well as into the prerogatives of republican first secretaries and their relationship with the central leaders. It will disappoint readers interested in Soviet leaders' private lives. The most intriguing personal detail it contains is that Shelest liked milk. On one long trip his wife had a freight wagon with a cow and a supply of hay attached to his train (p. 727).

Shelest wanted more autonomy for republics within a decentralized USSR, and a union between Ukraine and Russia, rather than independence. In a conversation with Zbigniew Brzezinski on the day Ukraine declared independence he said: "I don't know whether I should rejoice because today my country became independent or grieve because my second country, the one I served my whole life, has disappeared" (pp. 246, 705, 750, 754). While using Ukrainian in speeches, Shelest spoke Russian at home with his family (pp. 749, 763). He saw positive elements in Stalin's rule. He opposed the Czech reforms of 1967–68, and perhaps advocated, and definitely supported, the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia²⁰ (pp. 252, 282, 300, 316). Shelest was in fact the intermediary who relayed the letter of the pro-Soviet Czech Communists asking for military intervention to Brezhnev. Vasil Bilak slipped it to him surreptitiously in a public washroom in Bratislava on 3 August (p. 278).

20. In his diary Shelest does not explicitly say that he called for intervention and claims that his support was reluctant and critical. His remarks at the time implicitly advocated armed intervention (M. Kramer, "Ukraine and the Czecho-Slovak Crisis of 1968 (Part 2): New Evidence from the Ukrainian Archives," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, nos. 14–15 [Spring 2004]: 276–327).

Yet, he counseled moderation in dealing with intellectuals who criticized the party during the sixties. He referred to them as “hotheads” and “Don Quixotes,” who threaten to hinder “our common struggle,” by which he meant greater autonomy for Ukraine (pp. 222, 237, 714). He had nothing to do with the arrests in 1970–73 (pp. 310, 328–9, 764, 728). He had the courage to tell Suslov to his face to stop condemning the Ukrainian Cossacks as it was only thanks to their military prowess in Turko-Tatar wars that Suslov was sitting in his Kremlin office (p. 6).

The anthology on Shcherbytsky appeared within weeks of Shapoval’s book. Sponsored and funded by the government with public money, it was published in 5,000 copies and the editors mentioned a forthcoming Russian-language edition. The money was channeled through the Volodymyr V. Shcherbytsky Ukrainian Statehood Benevolent Fund, which really exists, much like the Qaddafi Human Rights Award.²¹ It is also worth noting that in the Pereiaslav jubilee year Ukraine’s neo-Soviet Russophile elite celebrated itself as well as its former patron in a book sponsored by the General Military Union of Ukraine, which is linked with the secret police. Published in 5,000 copies on bond paper in Ukrainian and bad English, the book’s first thirty-seven pages contain five colour photos of Kuchma, fifteen of Yanukovich, twenty-two of its editor, and singles of other stalwarts—few of them have anything to do with Arabia.²² This volume, like *Volodymyr Shcherbytsky*, the first version of *Bezsmertia*, *Orhany derzhavnoi bezpeky*, and Kuchma’s collected works in two volumes, was published “privately” and was unobtainable in bookstores—much like high-brow pornography a century ago.

The first part of the Shcherbytsky anthology contains a selection of reminiscences. Most are hagiographic and portray Volodia as a jolly good fellow. These will appeal to the same kind of people that in the 1930s thought Adolf was a jolly good fellow because he liked dogs and cream-cakes. One of them tells us that Shcherbytsky never spoke Ukrainian

21. In what turned out to be my last correspondence with James Mace, I asked him if he had heard of this book or the organization with the oxymoronic name that had paid for it. I was curious who was behind the fund and if it was legal. He replied that he had never heard of the book or the organization, whose name absolutely flabbergasted him. Even if it was a money-laundering front, he said, the situation in Ukraine was such that no one would care.

22. O. Kalashnikov, ed., *Ukraina-Arabskyi svit* (Kyiv, 2004). There is no picture of Ukraine’s foremost Arabic scholar Ahatanhel Krymsky.

because as a “delicate” and unassuming man he was ashamed of his Russicisms (p. 94). Some of the reminiscences contradict others found in the Shapoval anthology. Borys Paton, for instance, claims that Shcherbytsky did not try to dismiss Vitalii, Shelest’s son, from his job at the Academy of Sciences after his father was dismissed (p. 32). Vitalii’s mother said Shcherbytsky tried but failed (Shapoval, p. 734).

The second part contains a shortened Ukrainian translation of an earlier defence of Shcherbytsky published in Russian by his former aide, the powerful and feared Vitalii Vrublevsky.²³ This former Communist tells the reader what he thinks of Shcherbytsky in the opening pages: “Volodymyr Shcherbytsky was a leader sent by God” (p. 378). If that was so, then Ukrainians mindful of their nation’s sufferings in the twentieth century might well raise their eyes and ask why? Those not inclined to defer to the Almighty might prefer other, secular verdicts: “the balance between the positive and the negative in Shcherbytsky’s behaviour is definitely not on the side of the former.” Shcherbytsky was “the last of the Mohicans,” who either could not or did not want to know that the system was bankrupt and heading towards catastrophe.²⁴ The Russian Vladimir Semichastny, a former head of the KGB, said that “Shcherbytsky won because he was closer to Brezhnev than Petr Efimovich [Shelest].... Shcherbytsky was a devoted Brezhnevite lickspittle [*kholui*]. He never objected even to Brezhnev’s stupidest proposals.... There was not one ministry under Shcherbytsky where the minister or deputy was not from Dnipropetrovsk.... The Moscow joke about the new periodization of Russian history was incarnated in Ukraine [where] the pre-Petrine [Shelest] period was followed by the Petrine and the Dnipropetrine periods” (Shapoval, pp. 725, 729–30). Shelest for his part was contemptuous of Shcherbytsky, whom he considered a fawning careerist of the worst sort, all too willing to do Brezhnev’s bidding. Why do we neglect our own nation’s culture, Shelest asked. “Only dullards and traitors to their own people can do this.... Shcherbytsky is this kind of person.... Such people in the halls of power are dangerous to their own nation” (Shapoval, p. 325; see also: pp. 219, 247, 356, 383, 393, 408).

Vrublevsky depicts Scherbytsky as a modest family-man with simple wants. A patriot who loved his mother and cared about the common people.

23. Vladimir Shcherbitsky: *Pravda i vymysly: Zapiski pomoshchnika, vospominaniia, dokumenty, slukhi, legendy, fakty* (Kyiv: Dovira, 1993).

24. D. Tabachnyk, “Apostol zastoju,” *Vitchyzna*, 1992, no. 11: 122.

His basic theme is that Shcherbytsky was responsible for everything “good” that happened in Ukraine. For example, he ensured that the restored Golden Gates of Kyiv were topped with a cross, passed environmental legislation, and restored the Kyiv Opera House (pp. 511, 524, 547). When in 1986, Boris Yeltsin, first secretary of the Moscow city party organization, asked Shcherbytsky to send him 40,000 calves so that Russians could have some choice meat for the holiday season, Shcherbytsky called him a hothead and refused to “pander to someone’s ambition at the cost of [our] republic” (p. 411). Vroblevsky approves of this action but does not tell us whether Moscow’s first secretaries normally gave orders to republic first secretaries. Nor does he compare the two men to give insight into the scope of the possible and a context for judging.

Shcherbytsky, we learn, showed his concern for the people by checking from his desk if there was meat, milk, and butter in the shops. He showed his concern for academics by maintaining cordial relations with the president of the Academy of Sciences and, contrary to Tabachnyk’s claim,²⁵ did not provide relatives or supporters with academic sinecures (pp. 423, 502–04). When Yeltsin assumed the job of first secretary in Moscow, he plunged into a frenzy of activity, exposing the sloth, corruption, ineptitude, venality, thievery, and lying that pervaded the Soviet system and within a few months arrested over 800 officials and staff. To bring food to tables he set-up *iarmarki*, where producers sold produce directly to consumers and bypassed the inept retail system. He publicly criticized the hated nomenklatura distribution system and began closing its special stores. To improve research and scholarship he tried to break the well-connected mafia of surplus intellectuals, most of whom spent their days in cynical idleness, joking, reading *samizdat*, flirting, and shopping during working hours. These anti-Communist party members, who were masters of evasion, produced nothing but useless reams of printed paper. Yeltsin tried to get rid of this academic dead weight, but within a year all his initiatives had petered out and everything went back to the way it was before.²⁶ Did Shcherbytsky try nothing similar because he knew it would fail or because Ukraine did not have similar problems? Vrublevsky does not say.²⁷

25. Ibid., 121.

26. L. Aron, *Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 131–217.

27. In the Russian version of his book Vrublevsky noted, in a passage omitted from the

In a section on the economy Vrublevsky draws attention to the negative consequences of Ukraine's subordination to central ministries. He claims that Shcherbytsky was sometimes infuriated by Moscow's dictates and tried to defend Ukraine's interests, but he provides no convincing examples of how his patron used the limited prerogatives²⁸ of his republic towards that end except that he gave an implicit instruction to surreptitiously ignore Andropov's anti-alcoholism campaign because it led to the destruction of vineyards and substantially lower tax revenues (pp. 497–500). In the final analysis, Vrublevsky concludes, Ukraine benefited economically from its association with Russia because it got back in finished goods and military spending what it lost in food exports. In particular, Ukraine benefited from the Soviet prices it paid for coal and gas, which were substantially lower than world prices (p. 510). He does not point out that had Moscow not squandered Ukrainian coal and gas in supplying the rest of the USSR and Eastern Europe during the Stalin years, Ukraine would not have had to buy energy in the last decades of the century. The claim that an absolute decline in Ukrainian production begins only after Shcherbytsky's death in 1991 (p. 510) is false. National income and industrial and agricultural production started declining in 1985.²⁹

Since Vrublevsky does not include footnotes or a bibliography in his work, and there are no detailed studies of the period, it is difficult to judge his case. But, as with the reminiscences in part 1, when we compare some of his claims with those in Shapoval's anthology or with accounts by others, serious omissions and divergences emerge.³⁰

Ukrainian version, that under Shcherbytsky the scale of corruption and graft in Ukraine was less and more controlled than elsewhere in the USSR (cf. 158).

28. These prerogatives are listed in I.S. Koropec'kyj, *Development in the Shadow: Studies in Ukrainian Economics* (Edmonton: CUIS Press, 1990), 139–49.

29. *Ukraina u tsyfrakh u 1993 rotsi* (Kyiv: Tekhnika, 1994), 4, 6. Similarly, Vrublevsky provides a chart (506–7) illustrating that under Shcherbytsky Ukraine produced more foodstuffs per capita than the United States or France, without explaining that it also harvested and processed much less than those countries. A sentence about the failure of the bureaucratic system to reduce waste found in the Russian book (155) is not in the Ukrainian edition.

30. Tabachnyk, "Apostol zastoju"; Ya. Bilinsky, "Shcherbytsky and Kremlin Politics," *Problems of Communism* 32 (July–August 1983): 1–20; M. Beissinger, "Ethnicity, the Personnel Weapon, and Neo-imperial Integration: Ukrainian and RSFSR Provincial Party Officials Compared," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, 1998, no. 1: 71–85.

Vrublevsky omits mentioning, for instance, that thanks to Shcherbytsky, the Ukrainian party in the 1980s had the highest percentage ever of ethnic Ukrainian members. Beissinger noted that this means that Ukrainians policed Ukrainians. Other observers routinely drew attention to the importance of Shcherbytsky's links with Brezhnev, the powerful Dnipropetrovsk party organization, and his recommendation, if not actual choice, of the men directly responsible for the arrests and repressions of 1972–78, Vitalii Fedorchuk and Valentyn Malanchuk. Vrublevsky plays down the importance of his former boss's personal and territorial links and his status within the Brezhnev group. Suslov sent Fedorchuk and Malanchuk, Vrublevsky claims, and Shcherbytsky's relationship with him was "complicated" (pp. 405, 408, 475, 478, 516, 518). According to Vrublevsky, Shcherbytsky refused Moscow's offers of promotion, fired Malanchuk as soon as he could because he disliked Malanchuk, and supported the cultural-literary elite after 1978 because he was concerned about Ukrainian culture (pp. 413–15, 481, 518–25). Bilinsky claims that Moscow refused to give Shcherbytsky his much desired promotion. Faced with the impossibility of rising higher, he decided to make his peace with the literary-cultural elite and eased repressions. This included firing Malanchuk. Vrublevsky (pp. 549–58) writes that Shcherbytsky could do nothing to stop the Chernobyl Power Station from being built and that after the accident he could do only what Moscow allowed. Apparently he let the May Day parade to go on as scheduled because Gorbachev had threatened to expel him from party if he did not (p. 553). Tabachnyk tells us that Shcherbytsky did what he could to ensure that the Chornobyl plant was built.

Vrublevsky admits that Shcherbytsky did not consider national issues important, and that this was "bad" for Ukraine. The root cause of the malaise was a wrong party line that led to local leaders struggling too zealously against "local nationalism," and to central leaders ignoring the struggle against "great-power chauvinism" (pp. 486–7, 491–2). He then assures us that through Shcherbytsky's incumbency his attitude towards Ukrainian national issues was changing and that had he lived, he would have supported independence as his successors did (pp. 494–5, 518). Presumably Vrublevsky considers the Ukrainian party's last Soviet-era leader Stanislav Hurenko's statement of August 1991 a minority opinion: "Today we will vote for Ukrainian independence, because if we don't we're in shit."

Vrublevsky blames the system, hyper-centralization, or just history, for what was “bad” in Soviet Ukraine under his patron (pp. 403, 412, 414, 493, 499, 549, 553). He blames Moscow for the arrests and repression in Ukraine after 1973 and Shelest for the earlier arrests and repressions (p. 401). His basic argument is that Shcherbytsky and his associates were a lesser evil. As pragmatic realists they realized that they could do nothing, so they did nothing, and thus saved Ukraine from worse leaders (pp. 490–1, 516–7). They were men of their time, who just followed orders. In his 1993 book, however, Vrublevsky made an important judgment that he later omitted from the shortened 2003 version. He claimed that if Ukraine was Moscow’s colony and its leaders Kremlin puppets, then it makes little sense to expect them to have behaved like leaders of an independent state. “Their behaviour befit their circumstances” (p. 216). If Vrublevsky and his ilk believe this, then we should reasonably expect them to use the Shcherbytsky Fund to publish a series of books celebrating all of Ukraine’s first secretaries beginning with Piatakov and Gopner and including Shelest. A puppet is a puppet. But there is no hint of such a project. It seems, therefore, that all puppets are not the same and that in Vrublevsky’s eyes Shcherbytsky-type collaborators suited the circumstances better than Shelest-type collaborators.

This kind of reasoning influenced some Ukrainian historians. Blaming Russia for Ukraine’s problems, they write that “Shelest treated [his] republic’s interests as primary,” and equivocate in dealing with collaborators like Shcherbytsky. In an ostensibly authoritative six-volume political history of twentieth-century Ukraine released last year, it took five people to write the chapter covering the sixties, seventies, and eighties. Using Vrublevsky as a source, they claim that because Shcherbytsky had “the traits of a patriot of Ukraine,” he tried to defend the interests of “Ukraine’s people.” They assess him as a lesser evil without saying what the greater evil might have been. But seventy pages later they write: “The servility of Ukraine’s authorities [under Shcherbytsky] resulted in colossal human, material, spiritual, and cultural losses for Ukraine.”³¹

31. I.F. Kuras et al., eds., *Politychna istoriia Ukrainy XX stolittia u shesty tomakh* (Kyiv: Heneza, 2003), 6: 223–7, 293. The authors do not actually give any examples of what precisely Shcherbytsky did to “successfully defend the interests of the republic.” Moscow rejected his June 1989 request that it stop building more nuclear power stations in Ukraine.

Shcherbytsky's appointees did not fight in defence of the old order. They survived the transition, formed "clans" and became the political-economic elite in 1991. Since then the Kyiv, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk clans have been keeping Ukraine Soviet, although not as successfully as their Belarusian friends. Unlike their Belarusian counterparts, they have had to contend with a strong national-cultural elite and a popular majority that considers itself Ukrainian rather than Soviet, Russian, Eastern Slavic, or "local." According to a 2000 survey, while thirty-eight percent of Ukraine's population consider themselves Russian or Soviet, sixty-six percent consider themselves Ukrainian. Fifty-two percent speak Ukrainian at home, fifty-three percent belong to a Ukrainian national church, twenty-five to thirty percent of the Orthodox faithful do not recognize the Russian patriarch, and thirty-three percent think that the collapse of the USSR was good for Ukraine.³² Ukraine's Neo-Soviet Russophile leaders recognized persons and events forbidden in Soviet times, without dispensing with the Russian-unity rhetoric and Soviet or Russian commemorations that pleased some of their likeminded conationals.

Others were not pleased. On the academic level, for instance, two Russophile historians have claimed that the government's post-1991 Ukrainian history textbooks are too "anti-Russian." In their opinion, these textbooks were sponsored by "descendants of Suslov and Zhdanov," whose "maniacal" obsession with power led them to exploit Ukrainian nationalism, which they had condemned previously when they were Soviet functionaries. Assuming that the Ukrainian and Russian pasts constitute a single national history, the two authors claim that those who share their opinion are ideologically "unengaged," while their opponents are engaged and biased. The only text-book they praise is "written in the spirit of the Soviet historiographical tradition."³³ On the popular level,

32. A. Kolodii, "Radianska identychnist ta ii nosii v nezalezhnii Ukraini," in *Ukraina v suchasnomu sviti: Konferentsiia vypusnykiv prohram naukovoho stazhuvannia u SShA*, ed. O.V. Haran et al. (Kyiv: Stylos, 2003), 38, 39. Those who consider themselves Ukrainian are almost equally divided between those who agree and disagree. On average three times more Russians and Soviets think that the collapse of the USSR was bad than think it was good (50).

33. L. Moisienkova and P. Martsinkovskii, "Rossiia v ukrainskikh uchebnikakh istorii," in *Rossiia i strany Baltii, Tsentralnoi i Vostochnoi Evropy, Iuzhnogo Kavkaza, Tsentralnoi Azii: Starye i novye obrazy v sovremennykh uchebnikakh istorii: Nauchnye doklady i soobshcheniia*, ed. F. Bomsdorf and G. Bordiugov (Moscow: Fond Fridrikha Naumanna,

there is a front organization of the Ukrainian Communist Party named the All-Ukrainian Union of Descendants of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Headed by the party leaders Petro Symonenko and Leonid Grach, this association condemns the “global financial oligarchy” and its plans to subordinate Ukraine to “Euro-Atlantic civilization.” In July 2003 it awarded prizes to ten Russian and Ukrainian high-school students who had won its competition for the best essays on the topic, “Ukraine + Russia = Love.” In March 2004 it awarded another set of prizes for a high-school student essay competition on “the significance of the 350th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Council and its role in strengthening and developing the friendship of the Ukrainian and Russian nations.” The themes in the competition announcements and the winning essays reflect the ideas of the 1954 “thesis.”³⁴

On the very fringe of Ukraine’s society a group of latter-day Little Russians and Russian nationalist extremists claims there is no such thing as a Ukrainian nationality, only a Little Russian branch of the Russian nation. These people attach no significance to Kyiv’s official Ukrainian-Russian unity rhetoric and ignore critical interpretations of Ukrainian-Russian relations.³⁵ For them the Treaty of Pereiaslav is important because it made Russia a world power. But until the end of the eighteenth century, they complain, it brought Russia no income from Ukraine and no benefits to common Little Russians, who suffered at the hands of their Cossack leaders. Ukrainians, they claim, are not a nationality, but a

2003) 70, 81, 91. Despite their polemical Russian bias, the authors do correctly note the lack of balanced accounts of Ukrainian-Russian relations written from regional perspectives. This book was funded by AIRO-XX, an organization sponsored by the Friedrich Naumann Fund, whose publications dealing with former non-Russian Soviet nationalities have a distinct neo-Soviet revanchist tone.

34. The group is on a Russian-only website (www.edinenie.Kiev.ua) with a direct link to the Russian Orthodox Church site. The winning essays are supposed to be published. That same year a Canadian Ukrainian foundation sponsored a competition for the best student essay on “The Consequences of the Pereiaslav Treaty for Ukraine,” which was published in Ia. Davydenko et al., *Naslidky Pereiaslavskoi rady 1654 roku: Zbirnyk statei*, ed. I. Hyrych (Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 2004).

35. S. Grigoriev, “Nuzhen novyi Pereiaslav,” *Verzhe*, 12 February 2004. According to this Zaporizhian journalist the views of Ukraine’s National Institute of Strategic Research and the historians in *Pereiaslavska rada* reflect “a temporary political conjuncture.” They repeat ideas formulated during the mid-nineteenth century by “western” intelligence services, which were intended to destroy the unity of the Slavs and which were adopted later by “activists of the Galician diaspora.” Grigoriev works for one of Boguslaev’s companies.

political party. Nurtured by stupid tsarist policies and naive “bleeding-heart” Russian liberals, after 1918 this party was fostered by the Communists and, finally, it came to power in 1991. Today, with the Kremlin’s complicity, it rules what should be part of Russia. Ukraine’s political leaders are anti-Russian, Russia’s leaders are pro-Ukrainian, and Ukraine’s Russians and Little Russians are lost because they are being Ukrainianized and no longer care about Russian culture.³⁶ These people are troubled by the fact that Russia finally ratified the delimitation of the border in 2004 and that, with EU assistance, Ukraine is turning its side of the border into a visible barrier. Not only do travelers see where Ukraine ends and Russia begins, but as of January 2004, for the first time since 1918, they must have passports to cross the border.

The official pro-Soviet and pro-Russian rhetoric and commemorations reflected the interests of the Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk clans, which were represented by President Kuchma, Viktor Medvedchuk, and Prime Minister Yanukovich. But they lacked internal logic and state-building rationale. First, the Kuchma-Medvedchuk circle sought to exploit the division in between pro- and anti-Russian or anti-Soviet groups in Ukraine, but it realized that it could exploit this latent east-west or nationalist-Soviet division only so far and did not attempt to commemorate simultaneously figures like Symon Petliura and Grigorii Piatakov at the one extreme, nor the national-communist Mykola Skrypnyk and the enlightened nobleman Vasyl Karazin, figures who arguably could have bridged the differences between the hostile groups, at the other extreme.³⁷ Thus Ukraine’s rulers excluded both the most and the least

36. S. Sidorenko, “Novaia Rossiia i byvshaia malorossiiia,” *Moskva*, 2003, no. 11: 129–57. This January the editorial board awarded the author, who lives near Kremenchuk, an annual prize. See also a similar piece by a Ukrainian citizen from Zaporizhzhia who seems to be affiliated with only Russian institutions: V. Talinin, “Malorossiiia v obiatiiakh globalizma i ‘ukrainskii natsionalizm,’” *Moskva*, 2002, no. 8: 160–71. Both articles can be found at <www.moskvam.ru>. In Moscow a Mikhail Smolin specializes in re-printing turn-of-the-century Ukrainophobic polemics: S. Shchegolev, *Istoriia “ukrainskogo” separatizma*, and “*Ukrainskaia bolezn*” *Russkoi natsii* (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Imperskaia Traditsiia, 2004). In his introduction to the first book Smolin, reiterating the early twentieth-century ideas of Russian Black Hundred writers, notes that “Ukraine” and “Ukrainians” are ideas invented by Turkic-Russian half-breeds, papal agents, and various demented reprobates to destroy Russia (17–23).

37. The government did not commemorate the 130th anniversary of Khrystian Rakovsky’s birth in 2003. This native Bulgarian was the first Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR. Beginning his political career in Ukraine as a centralist

divisive events and figures from their post-1991 national pantheon. As Mykola Riabchuk observed, Kuchma's government did not want reconciliation between pro- and anti-Russian or anti-Soviet groups in Ukraine. Artificially stimulating internal tensions by playing the latent fears of one group off against those of the other was hardly the way to create a new state, but it did enable the neo-Soviet Kuchma and Medvedchuk clans to present themselves as moderate centrists and, thereby, keep themselves in power. Official recognition of select Communist and non-Communist persons and events undercut both the organized Communist and organized national-democratic opposition to them.³⁸ Their pro-Russian rhetoric, meanwhile, justified a foreign policy that intended to make independent Ukraine into a neo-Soviet Russian vassal state.

Kuchma's government officially commemorated mutually incompatible events and persons. If collaborators like Shcherbytsky deserved to be commemorated for protecting Ukraine's interests against Moscow then it made no sense to commemorate a treaty that led to the situation in which Ukraine needed Shcherbytsky's protection. This public calendar violated logic, but it had a short-term political rationale: it helped to keep society divided and the opposing groups at odds. Future historians will determine whether or not the Kuchma-Medvedchuk group envisaged the Shcherbytsky and Pereiaslav commemorations as part of a presidential election strategy intended to generate an east-west or Ukrainian-Russian split within the country that it could then pretend to heal.

In Russia, alongside the government-sponsored neo-Slavophile imperial nostalgia, there is an extremist fringe of anti-Ukrainians, which together with its Little Russian brothers, celebrates the 1654 treaty as a "reunion."³⁹

who thought that making Ukrainian the state language was counter-revolutionary, he became a close ally of Skrypnyk and a strong advocate of autonomy and Ukrainization.

38. M. Riabchuk, *Dvi Ukrainy: Realni mezhi, virtualni viiny* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2002), 96–196.

39. The Russian media promulgate such opinions and they still figure in some treatments of Russian history. See L. Males and B. Motuzenko, *Vzaemni etnichni obrazy ukrainsiv ta rosiian u mas-media* (Kyiv, 2002); Ukrainian-related entries in *Entsiklopediia russkoi istorii*, ed. N.A. Benediktov, N.E. Benediktova. and E.N. Bazurina (Moscow: EKSMO-Press, 2000), and the above-mentioned *Sviataia Rus': Bolshaia entsiklopediia russkogo naroda* (cf. 8). This year's reprint edition of Shchegolev's infamous *Istoriia "ukrainskogo" separatizma* makes no reference to the Pereiaslav anniversary. For examples of current serious historical writing, see Ukrainian-related issues in *Novaia*

Nevertheless, except for an exhibition at the Russian Historical Museum and two articles in the January issue of *Rodina*, the government and Russians ignored the 350th anniversary.⁴⁰ In Ukraine articles about the events of 1654 published in the major academic and quality monthlies basically summarized views detailed in *Pereiaslavska rada*.

As students taught according to books like *Pereiaslavska rada* grow up, and adults taught according to the 1954 “thesis” die off, popular memory and academic interpretation of Ukrainian-Russian relations will converge. Pro-Soviet and pro-Russian commemorations of 1654 will become politically superfluous and will disappear from the public calendar.

Changes along the Ukrainian-Russian border also suggest that the “reunion” interpretation of Ukrainian-Russian relations could gradually fade away. Heavy trade, family ties and common interests between Kharkiv Oblast in eastern Ukraine and Belgorod Oblast in southern Russia have given rise to the idea of a Slobozhanshchyna Euroregion among the young generation of politicians, business leaders, and academics on both sides of the border. Concerned about Ukrainian-Russian relations as much as about their democratic “European” image abroad, these people reject historical interpretations based on imperial ideas of Slav unity. “It seems that the regional elites of eastern Ukraine (in our case, of Kharkiv Oblast), whose legitimacy depends on Ukrainian statehood but whose economic interests are closely linked to Russia, are interested in an ideology of Ukrainian-Russian cooperation which would stress the Ukrainian ‘origins’ of the region but would also provide a justification for ‘traditional’ [understood locally as voluntary and beneficial—S.V.] relations with Russia.”⁴¹ However, as the new Ukraini-

rossiiskaia entsiklopediia, ed. A.D. Nekipelov, vol. 1 (Moscow: Entsiklopediia, 2003) or *Rossiiskii entsiklopedicheskii slovar*, ed. A.M. Prokhorov, 2 vols. (Moscow: Bolshaia rossiiskaia entsiklopediia, 2000).

40. In the first article Rafalsky listed beneficial short-term and deleterious long-term results of the treaty for Ukraine. In the second article two Russian historians focused exclusively on its benefits. O. Rafalsky, “Naibolshaia legenda slavianskoi istorii,” and N. Petrukhintsev, A. Smirnov, “Brak po raschetu,” *Rodina*, 2004, no. 1: 10–19. This glossy magazine is financed by the government. The January issue was devoted to the 100th anniversary of the Russo-Japanese War. A conference on the Treaty of Pereiaslav in St. Petersburg was funded by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.

41. T. Zhurchenko, “Cross-Border Cooperation and Transformation of Regional Identities in the Ukrainian-Russian Borderlands: Towards a Euroregion ‘Slobozhanshchyna’?” part 2, *Nationalities Papers*, 2004, no. 2: 504.

an-Russian relations in the border regions develop, it is unlikely they will repeat old imperial and Soviet models.

In this age of pop-culture the average person has little interest in, and knowledge of, history, and this ignorance can just as soon nullify the impact of hostile/old-imperial stereotypes as reinforce them. When today's young Ukrainians look back at 2004, will they think of Ruslana, "Wild Dances," and the Eurovision Song Contest, or of Russia, Pereiaslav, and the Congress of the Slavic Peoples? Reflecting on Ruslana's success a newspaper reader perceptively wrote that he considered Verka Serdiuchka a representative of Ukraine's Little-Russian Soviet past and Ruslana a representative of the country's European future.⁴² Appropriately, Verka supported Yanukovich, while Ruslana declared herself for Yushchenko in the presidential election. Russian youth, for their part, are more interested in Pugacheva than Pugachev, and how many of them could distinguish between Shukshin, Utkin, Pushkin, Putin, and Apukhtin is moot.⁴³

One likely result of Yushchenko's victory is that Ukraine's fringe groups, which, like warts, are always with us, will continue to celebrate 1654 and fondly remember the Bruikhovetskys, Shcherbytskys and Verkas. But whether the country's organized neo-Soviet Russophiles and Little Russians will be as harmless as Canada's United Empire Loyalists or as influential as Northern Ireland's Orange Order remains to be seen. Will they celebrate the 340th anniversary of Briukhovetsky's "Moscow Articles of 1665 in 2005?"

Ironically, Yushchenko was born in 1954. Will his election victory mark 2004 as the last year of Ukraine's "Dnipropetrine period" and the beginning of the end of what began 350 years ago and was celebrated with such gusto when he was born? How his government commemorates the Battle of Poltava in 2009 will tell us much about its direction.

42. *Den*, 18 May 2004.

43. The average non-history major Russian university student's knowledge about his country's past may be found in examination answers compiled by Prof. G. Druzhinin: <http://zhurnal.lib.ru/d/druzhinin_g_g/responce.shtml>. Here, among other things, we learn that before 1917 Kyivan Rus' was called Ukraine and that Kyivan Rus' began when the Russian, liberated Ukraine from the Germans and joined it to Russia.

Review Article

1654 and All That in 2004

Stephen Velychenko

- Oleh O. Rafalsky. *Pereiaslavskiyi dohovir Ukrainy z Rosiieiu 1654 roku: Retrospektyvnyi analiz*. Kyiv: Heneza, 2004. 294 pp.
- Pavlo Sokhan et al., eds. *Pereiaslavska rada 1654 roku: Istoriohrafiiia ta doslidzhennia*. Kyiv: Smolyskyp, 2003. xx, 885 pp.
- Oleksandr I. Hurzhii and Taras V. Chukhlib, eds. *Pereiaslavska rada ochyma istorykiv, movoiu dokumentiv*. Kyiv: Ukraina, 2003. 430 pp.
- Iurii Shapoval, ed. *Petro Shelest: "Spravzhnii sud istorii shche poperedu": Spohady, shchodennyky, dokumenty, materialy*. Kyiv: Heneza, 2003. 807 pp.
- Viktor F. Andriienko et al. *Volodymyr Shcherbytsky: Spohady suchasnykiv*. Ed. V.I. Kyiashko. Kyiv: In Iure, 2003. 587 pp.
- Andrzej Gil. *Dekret prezydenta Leonida Kuczmy o obchodach 350 rocznicy Kozackiej Rady Perejaslawskiej 1654 r., i jego znaczenie dla wewnetrznej i zewnetrznej sytuacji Ukrainy*. Lublin: Instytut Europy Srodkowo-Wschodniej, 2003. 60 pp.

The 1654 Treaty of Pereiaslav seemed fated to go the way of other early-modern treaties. Many on both sides opposed it. Within a few years after having proclaimed it eternal, both signatories contravened its stipulations: one declared it null and void, and then both declared war on each other. Bohdan Khmelnytsky actually hid and never disseminated his copy of the treaty, while the Council of Officers did not ratify it. In 1659 Russian envoys gave the document a new lease on life when they alleged that the more restrictive terms they had drawn up that year for a Ukrainian delegation to sign were the terms of 1654. Fifty years later Peter I learned

that the original document had disappeared and by 1789 Cossack Ukraine, the territory to which the treaty referred, also disappeared. The treaty became legally relevant once more at the turn of the nineteenth century in connection with talks about Finnish and Polish autonomy and then again in 1917.

In 1904 the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party published two postcards commemorating the 250th anniversary of the treaty, which graphically condemned it as the beginning of Ukraine's enslavement.¹ The party's activists formed the first Ukrainian terrorist organization, Defense of Ukraine, and tried to blow up Pushkin's statue in Kharkiv to protest the anniversary. On 18 January that year Panas Saksahansky's Ukrainian troupe staged a Sunday evening performance of *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* at the Bergoli theatre in Kyiv. Kyiv newspapers mention no other public commemorations.² In 1914, at the Kadet party's annual conference, Mykhailo Hrushevsky referred to the treaty as a model, but that year national leaders devoted their energies to the centennial of Taras Shevchenko's birth, not to the anniversary of the Pereiaslav Council. Between 1917 and 1921 Ukrainian governments and political groups commemorated the events of 1654 as they saw fit. An article in Nestor Makhno's newspaper *Shliakh do voli* (27 November 1919) explained that his followers were not concerned with what one dictator, Khmelnytsky, did with another dictator, Tsar Aleksei in 1654. Their "ex-slaves," who were free now, embraced the motto "death to all exploiters." In the 1930s Mikhail Pokrovsky's criticism of Khmelnytsky was reflected in the huge grey shroud that concealed the hetman's statue in front of St. Sophia Cathedral during Soviet holiday celebrations. The Soviet regime officially celebrated the treaty for the first time only in 1944, on Nikita Khrushchev's recommendation. In 1954, on the treaty's 300th anniversary, Communist Party officials and historians gave it yet another lease on life as the basis of an official interpretation of history that stressed Ukrainian-

1. M. Zabochen, O. Polishchuk, and V. Iatsuk, *Na spomyn ridnoho kraiu: Ukraina u starii lystivtsi* (Kyiv: Krynytsia, 2000), 207. The drawings by the Eastern Ukrainian Vasyl Riznychenko were published under a pseudonym in Austrian-ruled Galicia. One depicts a snickering Tsar Aleksei holding chains and the other Peter I beating a Ukrainian woman with his sceptre.

2. *Kievlianin*, *Kievskaiia gazeta*, and *Kievskoe slovo* carried no related articles or even a review of the play. The Lviv newspaper *Dilo* ran lead articles on the treaty as Ukraine's tragedy and how Galician Polish newspapers presented the issue (15 [28] and 17 [30] January 1904).

Russian similarities and how Ukraine benefited from political association with Russia. In a “thesis” proclaimed that year an anonymous group of mostly Ukrainian historians headed by Andrii Lykholat depicted the treaty as a voluntary reunion of two fraternal nations. For the next thirty-seven years millions of students throughout the USSR were taught only this particular interpretation of the past.

Eleven years after independence, in March 2002, President Kuchma called for the commemoration of the treaty that marked the beginning of Russian rule in Ukraine. In January 2004 he sat alongside Russia’s president at a gala concert in Kyiv celebrating the Treaty of Pereiaslav. Outside, protesters shouted “Putin go home,” while others demonstrated nearby in support of “Ukrainian-Russian reunion.” On New Year’s Day 2004, either by accident or intent, Verka Serdiuchka dominated all Russian and Ukrainian television programs and polled unprecedented high ratings.³ This character, invented by Poltava-born Andrii Danylko, has pop-cult status in Russia and eastern Ukraine. Verka, a naïve, simpleminded woman, sings and speaks in *surzhyk* (a Russian-Ukrainian patois) in a Russian version of the old American minstrel shows. This burlesque character represents a Soviet-type “Little Russian” that audiences find hilarious and some critics condemn as a demeaning stereotype that panders to and reinforces Russian anti-Ukrainian preconceptions.

The treaty’s anniversary spawned a number of books and articles dealing with Ukrainian-Russian relations, six of which are reviewed here. Four cover the events of 1654, their significance and interpretation. Two others deal with the last two representatives of the long line of Ukrainian collaborationist leaders that followed the treaty. Together, these books provide insight into the impact of the Russian legacy in Ukraine, the thinking of the country’s neo-Soviet political leaders, and the politics of collaboration, historiography, and commemorations.

The book by Rafalsky, a functionary of the Presidential Administration, is a lame attempt to use the legacy the 1654 agreement to justify Kuchma’s pro-Russian neo-Soviet policies. The author claims that, because the consequences of the treaty were both unforeseen and unfortunate for Ukraine, Ukrainians today must remember it as their government enters into a new relationship with Russia. Rafalsky pays

3. *Izvestiia*, 10 January 2004; *Den*, 10 January 2004.

little attention to Poland and the European Union and instead sees a future Ukraine as the third member of an anti-European, anti-Asian, Russian-Belarusian “Rus’ alliance.” President Kuchma’s pursuit of this objective, meanwhile, supposedly makes his foreign policy much like Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s (p. 186)! In a ridiculous attempt to attach patriotic patina to this desired “alliance,” he misrepresents and cites out of context a reference to such a possibility made by the Ukrainian conservative thinker Viacheslav Lypinsky (pp. 188, 199–201). Instead of concluding that people who get burned should not put their fingers into the fire again, Rafalsky claims that past experience will lead Ukrainians to build a better relationship with Russia, similar to that which exists between Canada and the United States (p. 196). He seems to be oblivious to Canada’s economic, cultural, and, some argue, even political dependency on the United States, a dependency some call neo-colonialism. Rafalsky includes the 1997 Ukrainian-Russian cooperation treaty in his appendix of twelve documents and approvingly notes that, because Russia ratified it in 1999, Ukraine “did not lean westwards.” Then he briefly summarizes the liberal attitudes of Kyiv and Moscow on national issues and claims that the political role of post-imperial nationalism is declining in both countries (p. 194). He does not mention how much of Ukraine’s economy and mass media is owned by Russian companies or that Russia and Ukraine both have approximately twelve million of the other’s nationals in their countries. Nor does he consider that although Kyiv spends millions if not billions of *karbovantsi* providing for the cultural needs of its Russian-speaking citizens, who in addition enjoy the Russian-language audio-visual products produced by Russian corporations in Russia and Ukraine, Moscow has yet to spend anything on its Ukrainian-speaking citizens, who have little or no access to privately produced Ukrainian-language audio-visual products. “The Year of Ukraine in Russia” came and went in 2003 with not one of Russia’s Ukrainian organizations receiving a kopeck of government money, not to mention access to government radio and television. In his conclusion, Rafalsky approvingly quotes Kuchma, who wrote that in 1654 Russia represented the only realistic option for Ukrainians: better to be Russian serfs than Turkish slaves, he claimed (p. 208). Today, however, ex-Turkish slaves are next in line to join the European Union, while fifteen years after independence Ukrainian is still not spoken in Kyiv’s streets. How many years after independence did residents of Athens and Sofia continue to speak Turkish?

At an official government-sponsored international conference held in February 2004 in Pereiaslav, most speakers were critical of the treaty and its consequences for Ukraine.⁴ The opposite view dominated the first Congress of the Slavic Peoples of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus held in Zaporizhzhia in May. In an unsigned statement published two years earlier this shadowy organization declared that it sought to recreate the political and religious unity of the Eastern Slavs within a common financial and economic complex.⁵ The Zaporizhzhia Oblast governor and local business oligarchs, in particular, the notorious local Ukrainophobe Viacheslav Boguslaev, sponsored the conference, which was attended by the Russian patriarch. The meeting opened with official greetings from the Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian governments. F. Muravchenko's long speech on the "Jewish-Masonic threat" to the Slavs received repeated thunderous ovations.⁶ Spokesmen called for the integration of the three participating nations and announced the group's intention to back a suitable candidate in the upcoming presidential election in Ukraine. The group got less media coverage than it perhaps expected, however. The day before the conference opening, Ruslana returned to Kyiv and, according to Agence France-Presse, "Ukraine went nuts." Contracted to the recording giant EMI, Ruslana, previously ignored by Ukrainian radio and television and unknown in Russia, had just won the Eurovision song contest. As of November her "Wild Dances" album had legally sold over 250,000 copies in Ukraine alone.⁷

350 years ago dynastic monarchy was a fundamental institution and nations were defined by princes and generals. So when a consecrated

4. M.T. Tovkailo, ed., *Pereiaslavska Rada: Istorychne znachennia ta politychni naslidky* (Kyiv, Prosvita, 2003). See also V.A. Smolii, et al., *Ukraina ta Rosiia: Problemy politychnykh i sotsiokulturnykh vidnosyn* (Kyiv: Instytut istorii NAN Ukrainy, 2003). R.P. Ivanchenko-Ivanova, ed., *Uroky Pereiaslava: Do 350-richchia Moskovsko-Pereiaslavskoi uhody* (Kyiv, 2004) is a collection of critical essays written primarily by university students.

5. "Zaiavlenie sezda slavianskikh narodov Belarusi, Rossii i Ukrainy," *Molodaia gvardiia*, 2002, no. 3: 205–8.

6. "Slavianskii sobor — v stolitse kazachestva," *Industrialnoe Zaporozhe*, 11 May 2004. I am grateful to Fedir Turchenko and Volodymyr Kravchenko for this information. On Boguslaev's dubious activities in support of Yanukovych's candidacy during the presidential elections, see <<http://www.maidan.org.ua/static/news/1101422602.html>> and <<http://www.maidan.org.ua/static/news/1101824923.html>>.

7. Audio and video at <<http://www.keithm.utvinternet.ie/Winners.htm>>.

legitimate ruler in 1654 duly recognized a man with a sword as leader of Cossack Ukraine, the country formally became part of the seventeenth-century European political map. Today nations are defined by pop stars and rock divas, and the Eurovision Song Contest, with an estimated 500 million viewers, represents one of Europe's new fundamental institutions. So when a woman with a microphone won first prize in 2004 she took what can be seen in hindsight as the first step in making her newly independent country part of the twenty-first-century European consciousness. The second step occurred in April when the Ukrainian boxer Vitalii Klichko won the world heavyweight title. The third step took place seven months later when hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians wearing orange colours peacefully showed their support for Viktor Yushchenko.

Russian capital controls or owns as much as eighty percent of Ukraine's economy while Ukrainian-born neo-Soviet Russophile oligarchs control approximately ninety percent of its communications network, a fact that explains why Russian still predominates in Ukraine's media. At least half of the country's Orthodox faithful are subject to the Russian patriarch in Moscow, not to the Ukrainian patriarch in Kyiv, and Kuchma allowed clergy who formally owe allegiance to a foreign national and do not recognize the existence of a Ukrainian nationality to teach religion in government ministries and serve as chaplains in the army. In an encyclopedia sponsored by the Russian Orthodox Church the entry for Little Russia (*Malorossiiia*) explains that "Ukrainian" is a term invented by "Russia's enemies" and popularized after 1917 by "Jewish Bolsheviks." The entry for the Pereiaslav Council says that it "reunified the Russian nation."⁸

Against this background many condemned Kuchma's intention to commemorate the 350th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Treaty as an attempt to justify and celebrate Ukrainian dependency on Russia by reanimating the "thesis." Later events seemed only to confirm apprehensions about the intentions of Russia and Ukraine's neo-Soviet Russophile elite. In April 2004 the government took Ukraine into the Russian-dominated Single Economic Space, and in May a "New Iron Curtain" descended on the Polish-Ukrainian border. Throughout the year Putin paid

8. O.A. Platonov, ed., *Sviataia Rus': Bolshaia entsiklopediia russkago naroda*, vol. 3, *Russkoe gosudarstvo* (Moscow: Pravoslavnoe izdatelstvo, 2002), 481, 613. The entry on Ukraine explains that the name is intended "to Polonize and Germanize the Russian people" (829).

official visits to Ukraine, business leaders called for more Ukrainian-Russian joint ventures, the volume of Ukrainian-Russian bilateral trade increased substantially, and Kuchma called for an eastward reorientation of foreign policy. The role of Russian financing and “political technicians” in Ukraine’s presidential election hearkened to the nefarious activities of Russian envoys in 1654. Whereas the former added the dead to voting lists and then used them to pad returns in favour of Yanukovich, the latter travelled the country enrolling the dead on lists of the tsar’s sworn subjects. Yanukovich’s dealings with Putin before the presidential elections brought to mind Hetman Briukhovetsky’s discussions with Tsar Aleksei in 1665.

In reaction to the government’s initiative to celebrate 1654 some historians refused to do anything at all on the grounds that even a critical public discussion of the treaty would legitimize its commemoration. After all, the only bad publicity is no publicity. Others, spearheaded by the Archeographical Institute at the Academy of Sciences, organized “counter-conferences.”⁹ Some historians from this group compiled *Pereiaslavska rada 1654 roku*. Funded in part by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies and released just before the planned celebrations, this collection of almost a thousand pages was published in 5,000 copies in a country where specialized academic studies rarely exceed 2,000 copies. Part 1 contains previously published articles that are critical of the treaty and tsarist and Soviet interpretations of it. Some of these articles are bibliographical rarities. Particularly valuable are the analytical studies by Hrushevsky, Oleksander Ohloblyn, Andrii Iakovliv, and Mykhailo Braichevsky. Six articles in part 2 summarize most of the Russian-, Ukrainian-, Polish-, and English-language historiography on the treaty and another five examine related events. The book shows that, despite differences over details, modern historians of the treaty belong to one of two groups. The first, which includes most, but not all, Russian historians, depicts the treaty as an expression of religious and/or national “forces” that drove the two Orthodox peoples with similar languages and customs into union or reunion in a single state and that in the long run this benefited both sides. The second group, which consists mostly, but

9. For a list of conferences and publications initiated by national-democrats, see Ia. Fedoruk, “Diialnist orhkomitetu konferentsii ‘Pereiaslavska rada 1654 r.,’ (vybrana bibliohrafiia vidhukiv),” *Moloda Ukraina*, 2005, no. 1: 299–319. Conspicuously absent from this initiative was the Institute of History under Valerii Smolii.

not only, of Ukrainians, depicts the treaty as a political event that reflected the interests of the two signatories. Its long-term costs outweighed its short-term benefits as it had negative consequences for Ukraine. The latter view was echoed in an authoritative full-page newspaper article released at the end of January by Ukraine's National Institute of Strategic Research.¹⁰

Although there is a free consensus of Ukrainian historians on the latter view, it is not shared by the entire population. Among some “the imperial and Soviet variants of the pan-Russian (Eastern Slavic) interpretation [persist]. Their major representatives are primarily social activists, left inclined politicians, and more than a few history teachers, whom the local party-ideological activists in Soviet times regarded as their reserve” (p. 519). The idea that the Pereiaslav Treaty represented “Russian-Ukrainian unity” is a product of tsarist historiography. It was reiterated in the 1954 CPSU “thesis” and still lingers today. Schools in Russia still teach this idea and Russians can still declare publicly without fear of ridicule that there are no differences between Ukrainians and Russians and that their two countries should “reunite.”¹¹

Perhaps because the editors had less than two years to compile this necessary and important anthology they could not produce a definitive book on the subject. *Pereiaslavska rada* has no bibliography, no examination of popular memory about 1654, and no history of the treaty's commemorations. Articles overlap. Ukrainian-language articles cite English-language items not in the article devoted to English-language historiography, and there is no chapter on French-, German-, and Latin-language historiography. While the editors briefly note the importance of the political-intellectual context (pp. vii–x), not all of the authors in part 2 devote sufficient attention to it. No one examines the interrelationship between Russian historians of the Juridical School, who, in the twenty years before the revolution, produced some of the best scholarship on Pereiaslav, and the need of tsarist officials and Russian political leaders

10. A. Halchynsky, et al., “Uhoda 1654 roku: Istorychni uroky dlia ukrainskoho narodu,” *Den*, 31 January 2004; also published separately as *Pereiaslavska uhoda 1654 roku: Istorychni uroky dlia ukrainskoho narodu* (Kyiv: Natsionalnyi instytut stratehichnykh doslidzhen, 2004).

11. Russian anti-Ukrainian opinion is summarized and discussed in O.P. Lanovenko, ed., *Ukraina-Rosiia: Kontseptualni osnovy humanitarnykh vidnosyn* (Kyiv: Stylos, 2001), 264–318, 340–70.

at the time to deal with Polish, Finnish, and Ukrainian national demands. Finally, the book has no analysis of the 1954 CPSU “thesis,” nor does it mention the role of Ukrainian Soviet historians in formulating it. Three relevant studies are not noted: my “The Origins of the Soviet Interpretation of Eastern Slavic History. A Case Study in Policy Formulation,” in *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 46 (1990): 221–53; Natalia Iusova, “Heneza kontseptu ‘davnoruska narodnist’ u radianskii istorychnii nauksi,” *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2001, no. 6: 65–85; and Serhy Yekelchuk, *Stalin’s Empire of Memory: Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet Historical Imagination* (2004), which is based on his 2000 doctoral dissertation and was in press when the collection was being compiled. Iurii Mytsyk’s seminal study, “Dovkola ‘arkhivu Pereiaslavskoi rady’: Mify ta realii dzherelnoi bazy,” inexplicably appears separately in *Arkhiv Ukrainy*, 2003, nos. 4–6: 11–23.

The second anthology, *Pereiaslavska rada ochyma istorykiv, movoiu dokumentiv* includes fifteen previously published documents relating to the treaty, excerpts about it from five seventeenth- and eighteenth-century chronicles, and sixteen articles by modern historians. All but two of the articles and excerpts are shortened, and four (Viacheslav Lypynsky, Hrushevsky, Braichevsky, and Rostyslav Lashchenko) appear also in the preceding anthology. Unlike that anthology, this one contains two examples of non-nationalist Russian treatments of the subject (Venedikt Miakotin and Rozenfeld). The editors’ explicit purpose was to popularize the Ukrainian national interpretation of the Pereiaslav Treaty and to counter the imperial and Soviet interpretation of the treaty as an “eternal reunion,” which is current in Ukraine today (p. 18).

Particularly useful in this collection are the articles by Iurii Mytsyk, Olena Apanovych, and Volodymyr Horobets, which show how Muscovite and Ukrainian interests began to diverge within months of the signing of the treaty, as each side realized it was getting more than it had bargained for. Also noteworthy is the editors’ dating of the transformation of the Pereiaslav Treaty from political act to historical myth. The turning point came in 1659, two years after Khmelnytsky had died. In their attempt to legitimize the restrictive conditions, which amounted to annexation, they had imposed on his son that year, the Muscovite envoys claimed that the new terms were those of 1654 and they published the 1659 terms as a booklet for broader dissemination (p. 18). The editors might have added that, although the idea of the Pereiaslav Treaty as an Eastern Slavic “reunion” can be found in written documents from the second half of the

seventeenth century, it appeared rarely. Originating among pro-Russian Ukrainian Muscophile clerics and pro-Ukrainian Russian Graecophiles who defended the Ukrainian-Russian alliance against its opponents in Moscow, Kyiv, and Chyhyryn, the reunion idea, like the word “eternal,” was a rhetorical device rather than a part of a legitimizing theory that motivated action. The notion of reunion entered Russian national historiography in the nineteenth century, but the editors are guilty of oversimplification when they claim that it was formulated on government orders (p. 18).

Poland was Cossack Ukraine’s major enemy 350 years ago. In November 1654 Polish armies under Stefan Czarniecki conducted a savage campaign in Ukraine. Today the Polish government is one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters. In November 2004 it was the first European government to reject the falsified election returns and Lech Wałęsa came to Kyiv to show his support for Viktor Yushchenko. Poland has more centres of Ukrainian studies than any other country in the world and Polish *ukrainoznawstwo* is second to none. During the 1990s Polish scholars published more academic books about Ukraine than Ukrainian scholars and this despite the fact that the average Pole regards Ukrainians in much the same terms as the average German sees Poles.¹² It should not be surprising, therefore, that a Polish scholar wrote a succinct and useful analysis of the events associated with 1654 and 2004.¹³

Gil begins with theoretical observations concerning the difficulty faced by new governments ruling societies without a single shared identity in choosing events to commemorate. He describes the events and interpretations of the Pereiaslav Treaty and then summarizes reactions to the government’s decision to commemorate it. He observes that in 1996 Kuchma declared that in his mind the treaty is associated with Ukrainian independence. In the same speech Kuchma also recognized that tsarist policy was directed at “destroying the Ukrainian state and turning it into a Russian imperial colony.”¹⁴ It could be argued, therefore, that the government intended to use the anniversary to buttress the idea of

12. The majority in both countries is either hostile or indifferent towards their eastern neighbours. (L. Kolarska-Bobińska, ed., *Obraz Polski i Polaków w Europie* [Warsaw: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2003], 211, 214, 287, 295).

13. See also his “Pereiaslavska rada 1654 roku ta ii vplyv na suchasnu Ukrainu,” *Moloda natsiia: Almanakh*, no. 3 (2003): 15–39.

14. L. Kuchma, “Dopovid na urochystykh zborakh z nahody 400-richchia vid dnia narodzhennia Bohdana Khmelnytskoho,” *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1996, no. 4: 9.

Ukrainian independence. Nonetheless, Gil continues, that is not how many would understand the initiative. Those with pan-Russian or Eastern Slavic sympathies would interpret the commemoration as an official confirmation of their pro-Russian attitudes. Western Ukrainian (Uniate) Catholics could take exception to an official national celebration of an anti-Uniate social group (Cossacks) that had never inhabited their territories. Then Gil speculates that these diverse reactions could accent divisions within Ukraine, re-animate latent anti-Polish sentiments and even sour the country's relations with Poland (pp. 37, 48–9). Fortunately, he was wrong, as ceremonies and reactions were muted. Planned events for 2004 did not include a commemoration of the 435th anniversary of the 1569 Union of Lublin, which, Gil mistakenly thinks, Ukrainians, like Poles, consider a model of national co-existence (p. 51), nor of the 345th anniversary of the 1659 Hadiach Treaty, which made Cossack Ukraine the third part of a confederated Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. I have been unable to determine whether Ukraine sent official greetings to Poland in connection with the 210th anniversary of Kosciuszko's unsuccessful revolt against the Russians. There is no indication that the Kuchma-Medvedchuk government sent greetings to Moscow on the anniversary of the Russian victory: presumably, official neo-Soviet Ukrainian Russophilism has limits.

Ukraine's political history from 1659 to 1991 involved collaborationist elites. Marxists labeled such people in Third World colonies "comprador bourgeoisie." Exiled opponents who regarded any form of service under foreign rule as treason, denounced such collaborators as careerists, sycophants, and traitors. Analysts and historians, who are more tolerant of those not prepared to suffer exile, unemployment, or imprisonment in the name of abstract ideals distinguish types of collaboration. In Ukraine, men like Ivan Briukhovetsky and Pavlo Sudoplatov, for whom the interests and commands of the centre overrode all local concerns and who obeyed above and beyond the demands of self-interest or pragmatism, exemplify one type. Figures like Pavlo Polubotok and Mykola Skrypnyk represent another type. Occupying a grey middle ground, to the disgust of the exiled opponents of Russian rule, and never fully trusted by their Russian overlords, they tried to reconcile local interests with orders from the centre.

Had the Communists been defeated and subsequently executed or exiled, the post-1991 government would not have preserved symbols and memories of the country's Russian and Soviet connection, like the Pereiaslav Treaty, in Ukraine's national legacy. In all probability the government would have ignored what happened in 1654. But in 1989 old

collaborationist administrators became rulers and, as Mykola Riabchuk observed, one of their political survival tactics was to sponsor a “post-Communist eclecticism” in public commemorations; an amalgam of selected Soviet and non-Soviet events and persons, many of which were previously considered incompatible. The problem Ukraine’s neo-Soviet leaders faced was common enough, although their solution was not, as can be illustrated by the example of Ireland.

The two fundamental acts that defined Ireland’s subordination to England were the Treaty of Windsor (1125) and the Act of Union (1801). The Anglo-Irish Treaty (1921) established the Irish Free State, but nationalists then fought a civil war over the terms of settlement. The republic’s second president, William Cosgrave, represented the moderates and was not very popular. Satirists caricatured him as a British lackey, and he tolerated official Irish presence at British commemorations of the dead of the First World War in London, which the nationalists boycotted as symbols of imperialism. But it is difficult to imagine that Cosgrave, had he remained in office long enough, would have issued a formal statement in 1925 or 1931 on commemorating the 800th or 130th anniversary of the mentioned agreements, proclaimed a year of Anglo-Irish friendship, or attended a gala concert in Dublin with the British prime minister. During the first decades of the Irish Free State the political leaders realized that, because their respective factions drew legitimacy from rival interpretations of history, all commemorations would be tainted by politics and would be counterproductive. Accordingly, they were cautious in officially commemorating events and persons. When they did commemorate something it would be a shared episode that would reconcile all parties.¹⁵

Will Kuchma’s selection of events and persons for commemoration reconcile the opposed sides? The celebrated events and persons ostensibly balanced the pro-Russian or pro-Soviet sympathies of some of the population with the anti-Soviet national sympathies of others: the Year of Russia in Ukraine was offset by the commemoration of the 1933 Famine.¹⁶ The

15. D. Fitzpatrick, “Commemoration in the Irish Free State,” in *History and Memory in Modern Ireland*, ed. I. McBride (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 203. For a social analysis of official commemorations, see W.M. Johnston, *Celebrations: The Cult of Anniversaries in Europe and the United States Today* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1991).

16. Only future historians will be able to tell us if those who organized the Year of

government did not impose an “official interpretation” and allowed teachers to teach the interpretation of Pereiaslav accepted by Ukrainian historians. It built statues to Hrushevsky, but did not demolish those to Lenin. The government did not officially commemorate the 750th anniversary of the crowning of King Danylo of Halych (in 2003), the seventieth anniversary of Mykola Skrypnyk’s death (in 2003), the 125th anniversary of Symon Petliura’s birth (in 2004), or the 85th anniversary of the founding of the Ukrainian SSR (in 2004).¹⁷ On 22 January 2004 it officially commemorated the 85th anniversary of the union of Western and Eastern Ukraine into a single state, but that same day government-run television broadcast a sympathetic documentary about Lenin. In June 2004 the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian presidents attended the Soviet-era Youth Friendship Day Festival in Chernihiv Oblast and laid wreaths to commemorate the “victims of fascism.” They did not commemorate the “victims of communism.” A book on the Second World War came out in two different versions: in one the introduction explicitly states that, contrary to the opinion of some people, the editors consider OUN-UPA members hired collaborators of Nazi Germany.¹⁸ In the other, these sentences do not appear. Yanukovich sent official greetings to the Slavic peoples meeting in Zaporizhzhia. Four years ago, as head of Donetsk Oblast, he wrote an introduction to a local history of the Soviet secret police (Cheka-NKVD-KGB) in which he praised these organizations for defending “our nation’s interests” and for “faithful service to Ukraine’s state and people.”¹⁹ In 2003 the government celebrated the 85th anniversary of Volodymyr Shcherbytsky’s birth. It named a street in Dnipropetrovsk after him and placed his grave on the main avenue at Baikove Cemetery, thus inducting him into the new national pantheon. It did

Russia in Ukraine in 2003 hoped to distract public attention from the seventieth anniversary of the 1933 Famine. The “Year of Russia” web-site (www.russia.org.ua) does not even have a passing reference to the Famine. It includes a number of surveys designed to indicate popular sympathy for Russia.

17. The Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic was proclaimed in January 1919. Until then the Bolsheviks in Moscow formally considered the Bolsheviks in Kharkiv as the “legitimate” government of the Ukrainian National Republic, which they recognized, not as leaders of a different territorial unit that did not include the Donbas, Crimea, or the northern Black Sea coast.

18. I.O. Herasymov et al., eds., *Bezsmertia: Knyha pamiati Ukrainy 1941–1945* (Kyiv: Knyha Pamiati Ukrainy, 2000), 8.

19. V. Zuev and I. Kulaha, *Orhany derzhavnoi bezpeky v Donetskii oblasti* (Donetsk, 2000).

not celebrate the 95th anniversary of Petro Shelest's birth. In short, although Ukraine's neo-Soviet authorities do commemorate select non-Soviet and non-Russian aspects of the past, the past they favour is represented by Soviet-era collaborators of the Briukhovetsky-Sudoplatov tradition.

A few months after the Shcherbytsky anniversary celebration, Iurii Shapoval's anthology on Shelest appeared. Published in 2,000 copies, the book is invaluable to historians of Ukraine and Soviet politics. It has three parts. The first contains Shelest's complete memoirs and diary, which supercedes the shorter Russian edition of 1995. The second part contains a selection of eighty-one previously unpublished documents from the years 1964 through 1973 and the official condemnation of Shelest's book *Ukraino nasha radianska*. Part three contains a series of interviews with and about Shelest. This anthology provides insights into important events in Ukraine during the 1960s, as well as into the prerogatives of republican first secretaries and their relationship with the central leaders. It will disappoint readers interested in Soviet leaders' private lives. The most intriguing personal detail it contains is that Shelest liked milk. On one long trip his wife had a freight wagon with a cow and a supply of hay attached to his train (p. 727).

Shelest wanted more autonomy for republics within a decentralized USSR, and a union between Ukraine and Russia, rather than independence. In a conversation with Zbigniew Brzezinski on the day Ukraine declared independence he said: "I don't know whether I should rejoice because today my country became independent or grieve because my second country, the one I served my whole life, has disappeared" (pp. 246, 705, 750, 754). While using Ukrainian in speeches, Shelest spoke Russian at home with his family (pp. 749, 763). He saw positive elements in Stalin's rule. He opposed the Czech reforms of 1967–68, and perhaps advocated, and definitely supported, the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia²⁰ (pp. 252, 282, 300, 316). Shelest was in fact the intermediary who relayed the letter of the pro-Soviet Czech Communists asking for military intervention to Brezhnev. Vasil Bilak slipped it to him surreptitiously in a public washroom in Bratislava on 3 August (p. 278).

20. In his diary Shelest does not explicitly say that he called for intervention and claims that his support was reluctant and critical. His remarks at the time implicitly advocated armed intervention (M. Kramer, "Ukraine and the Czecho-Slovak Crisis of 1968 (Part 2): New Evidence from the Ukrainian Archives," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, nos. 14–15 [Spring 2004]: 276–327).

Yet, he counseled moderation in dealing with intellectuals who criticized the party during the sixties. He referred to them as “hotheads” and “Don Quixotes,” who threaten to hinder “our common struggle,” by which he meant greater autonomy for Ukraine (pp. 222, 237, 714). He had nothing to do with the arrests in 1970–73 (pp. 310, 328–9, 764, 728). He had the courage to tell Suslov to his face to stop condemning the Ukrainian Cossacks as it was only thanks to their military prowess in Turko-Tatar wars that Suslov was sitting in his Kremlin office (p. 6).

The anthology on Shcherbytsky appeared within weeks of Shapoval’s book. Sponsored and funded by the government with public money, it was published in 5,000 copies and the editors mentioned a forthcoming Russian-language edition. The money was channeled through the Volodymyr V. Shcherbytsky Ukrainian Statehood Benevolent Fund, which really exists, much like the Qaddafi Human Rights Award.²¹ It is also worth noting that in the Pereiaslav jubilee year Ukraine’s neo-Soviet Russophile elite celebrated itself as well as its former patron in a book sponsored by the General Military Union of Ukraine, which is linked with the secret police. Published in 5,000 copies on bond paper in Ukrainian and bad English, the book’s first thirty-seven pages contain five colour photos of Kuchma, fifteen of Yanukovych, twenty-two of its editor, and singles of other stalwarts—few of them have anything to do with Arabia.²² This volume, like *Volodymyr Shcherbytsky*, the first version of *Bezmertia*, *Orhany derzhavnoi bezpeky*, and Kuchma’s collected works in two volumes, was published “privately” and was unobtainable in bookstores—much like high-brow pornography a century ago.

The first part of the Shcherbytsky anthology contains a selection of reminiscences. Most are hagiographic and portray Volodia as a jolly good fellow. These will appeal to the same kind of people that in the 1930s thought Adolf was a jolly good fellow because he liked dogs and cream-cakes. One of them tells us that Shcherbytsky never spoke Ukrainian

21. In what turned out to be my last correspondence with James Mace, I asked him if he had heard of this book or the organization with the oxymoronic name that had paid for it. I was curious who was behind the fund and if it was legal. He replied that he had never heard of the book or the organization, whose name absolutely flabbergasted him. Even if it was a money-laundering front, he said, the situation in Ukraine was such that no one would care.

22. O. Kalashnikov, ed., *Ukraina-Arabskyi svit* (Kyiv, 2004). There is no picture of Ukraine’s foremost Arabic scholar Ahatanhel Krymsky.

because as a “delicate” and unassuming man he was ashamed of his Russicisms (p. 94). Some of the reminiscences contradict others found in the Shapoval anthology. Borys Paton, for instance, claims that Shcherbytsky did not try to dismiss Vitalii, Shelest’s son, from his job at the Academy of Sciences after his father was dismissed (p. 32). Vitalii’s mother said Shcherbytsky tried but failed (Shapoval, p. 734).

The second part contains a shortened Ukrainian translation of an earlier defence of Shcherbytsky published in Russian by his former aide, the powerful and feared Vitalii Vrublevsky.²³ This former Communist tells the reader what he thinks of Shcherbytsky in the opening pages: “Volodymyr Shcherbytsky was a leader sent by God” (p. 378). If that was so, then Ukrainians mindful of their nation’s sufferings in the twentieth century might well raise their eyes and ask why? Those not inclined to defer to the Almighty might prefer other, secular verdicts: “the balance between the positive and the negative in Shcherbytsky’s behaviour is definitely not on the side of the former.” Shcherbytsky was “the last of the Mohicans,” who either could not or did not want to know that the system was bankrupt and heading towards catastrophe.²⁴ The Russian Vladimir Semichastny, a former head of the KGB, said that “Shcherbytsky won because he was closer to Brezhnev than Petr Efimovich [Shelest].... Shcherbytsky was a devoted Brezhnevite lickspittle [*kholui*]. He never objected even to Brezhnev’s stupidest proposals.... There was not one ministry under Shcherbytsky where the minister or deputy was not from Dnipropetrovsk.... The Moscow joke about the new periodization of Russian history was incarnated in Ukraine [where] the pre-Petrine [Shelest] period was followed by the Petrine and the Dnipropetrine periods” (Shapoval, pp. 725, 729–30). Shelest for his part was contemptuous of Shcherbytsky, whom he considered a fawning careerist of the worst sort, all too willing to do Brezhnev’s bidding. Why do we neglect our own nation’s culture, Shelest asked. “Only dullards and traitors to their own people can do this.... Shcherbytsky is this kind of person.... Such people in the halls of power are dangerous to their own nation” (Shapoval, p. 325; see also: pp. 219, 247, 356, 383, 393, 408).

Vrublevsky depicts Scherbytsky as a modest family-man with simple wants. A patriot who loved his mother and cared about the common people.

23. Vladimir Shcherbitsky: *Pravda i vymysly: Zapiski pomoshchnika, vospominaniia, dokumenty, slukhi, legendy, fakty* (Kyiv: Dovira, 1993).

24. D. Tabachnyk, “Apostol zastoju,” *Vitchyzna*, 1992, no. 11: 122.

His basic theme is that Shcherbytsky was responsible for everything “good” that happened in Ukraine. For example, he ensured that the restored Golden Gates of Kyiv were topped with a cross, passed environmental legislation, and restored the Kyiv Opera House (pp. 511, 524, 547). When in 1986, Boris Yeltsin, first secretary of the Moscow city party organization, asked Shcherbytsky to send him 40,000 calves so that Russians could have some choice meat for the holiday season, Shcherbytsky called him a hothead and refused to “pander to someone’s ambition at the cost of [our] republic” (p. 411). Vroblevsky approves of this action but does not tell us whether Moscow’s first secretaries normally gave orders to republic first secretaries. Nor does he compare the two men to give insight into the scope of the possible and a context for judging.

Shcherbytsky, we learn, showed his concern for the people by checking from his desk if there was meat, milk, and butter in the shops. He showed his concern for academics by maintaining cordial relations with the president of the Academy of Sciences and, contrary to Tabachnyk’s claim,²⁵ did not provide relatives or supporters with academic sinecures (pp. 423, 502–04). When Yeltsin assumed the job of first secretary in Moscow, he plunged into a frenzy of activity, exposing the sloth, corruption, ineptitude, venality, thievery, and lying that pervaded the Soviet system and within a few months arrested over 800 officials and staff. To bring food to tables he set-up *iarmarki*, where producers sold produce directly to consumers and bypassed the inept retail system. He publicly criticized the hated nomenklatura distribution system and began closing its special stores. To improve research and scholarship he tried to break the well-connected mafia of surplus intellectuals, most of whom spent their days in cynical idleness, joking, reading *samizdat*, flirting, and shopping during working hours. These anti-Communist party members, who were masters of evasion, produced nothing but useless reams of printed paper. Yeltsin tried to get rid of this academic dead weight, but within a year all his initiatives had petered out and everything went back to the way it was before.²⁶ Did Shcherbytsky try nothing similar because he knew it would fail or because Ukraine did not have similar problems? Vrublevsky does not say.²⁷

25. Ibid., 121.

26. L. Aron, *Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 131–217.

27. In the Russian version of his book Vrublevsky noted, in a passage omitted from the

In a section on the economy Vrublevsky draws attention to the negative consequences of Ukraine's subordination to central ministries. He claims that Shcherbytsky was sometimes infuriated by Moscow's dictates and tried to defend Ukraine's interests, but he provides no convincing examples of how his patron used the limited prerogatives²⁸ of his republic towards that end except that he gave an implicit instruction to surreptitiously ignore Andropov's anti-alcoholism campaign because it led to the destruction of vineyards and substantially lower tax revenues (pp. 497–500). In the final analysis, Vrublevsky concludes, Ukraine benefited economically from its association with Russia because it got back in finished goods and military spending what it lost in food exports. In particular, Ukraine benefited from the Soviet prices it paid for coal and gas, which were substantially lower than world prices (p. 510). He does not point out that had Moscow not squandered Ukrainian coal and gas in supplying the rest of the USSR and Eastern Europe during the Stalin years, Ukraine would not have had to buy energy in the last decades of the century. The claim that an absolute decline in Ukrainian production begins only after Shcherbytsky's death in 1991 (p. 510) is false. National income and industrial and agricultural production started declining in 1985.²⁹

Since Vrublevsky does not include footnotes or a bibliography in his work, and there are no detailed studies of the period, it is difficult to judge his case. But, as with the reminiscences in part 1, when we compare some of his claims with those in Shapoval's anthology or with accounts by others, serious omissions and divergences emerge.³⁰

Ukrainian version, that under Shcherbytsky the scale of corruption and graft in Ukraine was less and more controlled than elsewhere in the USSR (cf. 158).

28. These prerogatives are listed in I.S. Koropecykyj, *Development in the Shadow: Studies in Ukrainian Economics* (Edmonton: CUIS Press, 1990), 139–49.

29. *Ukraina u tsyfrakh u 1993 rotsi* (Kyiv: Tekhnika, 1994), 4, 6. Similarly, Vrublevsky provides a chart (506–7) illustrating that under Shcherbytsky Ukraine produced more foodstuffs per capita than the United States or France, without explaining that it also harvested and processed much less than those countries. A sentence about the failure of the bureaucratic system to reduce waste found in the Russian book (155) is not in the Ukrainian edition.

30. Tabachnyk, "Apostol zastoju"; Ya. Bilinsky, "Shcherbytsky and Kremlin Politics," *Problems of Communism* 32 (July–August 1983): 1–20; M. Beissinger, "Ethnicity, the Personnel Weapon, and Neo-imperial Integration: Ukrainian and RSFSR Provincial Party Officials Compared," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, 1998, no. 1: 71–85.

Vrublevsky omits mentioning, for instance, that thanks to Shcherbytsky, the Ukrainian party in the 1980s had the highest percentage ever of ethnic Ukrainian members. Beissinger noted that this means that Ukrainians policed Ukrainians. Other observers routinely drew attention to the importance of Shcherbytsky's links with Brezhnev, the powerful Dnipropetrovsk party organization, and his recommendation, if not actual choice, of the men directly responsible for the arrests and repressions of 1972–78, Vitalii Fedorchuk and Valentyn Malanchuk. Vrublevsky plays down the importance of his former boss's personal and territorial links and his status within the Brezhnev group. Suslov sent Fedorchuk and Malanchuk, Vrublevsky claims, and Shcherbytsky's relationship with him was "complicated" (pp. 405, 408, 475, 478, 516, 518). According to Vrublevsky, Shcherbytsky refused Moscow's offers of promotion, fired Malanchuk as soon as he could because he disliked Malanchuk, and supported the cultural-literary elite after 1978 because he was concerned about Ukrainian culture (pp. 413–15, 481, 518–25). Bilinsky claims that Moscow refused to give Shcherbytsky his much desired promotion. Faced with the impossibility of rising higher, he decided to make his peace with the literary-cultural elite and eased repressions. This included firing Malanchuk. Vrublevsky (pp. 549–58) writes that Shcherbytsky could do nothing to stop the Chernobyl Power Station from being built and that after the accident he could do only what Moscow allowed. Apparently he let the May Day parade to go on as scheduled because Gorbachev had threatened to expel him from party if he did not (p. 553). Tabachnyk tells us that Shcherbytsky did what he could to ensure that the Chornobyl plant was built.

Vrublevsky admits that Shcherbytsky did not consider national issues important, and that this was "bad" for Ukraine. The root cause of the malaise was a wrong party line that led to local leaders struggling too zealously against "local nationalism," and to central leaders ignoring the struggle against "great-power chauvinism" (pp. 486–7, 491–2). He then assures us that through Shcherbytsky's incumbency his attitude towards Ukrainian national issues was changing and that had he lived, he would have supported independence as his successors did (pp. 494–5, 518). Presumably Vrublevsky considers the Ukrainian party's last Soviet-era leader Stanislav Hurenko's statement of August 1991 a minority opinion: "Today we will vote for Ukrainian independence, because if we don't we're in shit."

Vrublevsky blames the system, hyper-centralization, or just history, for what was “bad” in Soviet Ukraine under his patron (pp. 403, 412, 414, 493, 499, 549, 553). He blames Moscow for the arrests and repression in Ukraine after 1973 and Shelest for the earlier arrests and repressions (p. 401). His basic argument is that Shcherbytsky and his associates were a lesser evil. As pragmatic realists they realized that they could do nothing, so they did nothing, and thus saved Ukraine from worse leaders (pp. 490–1, 516–7). They were men of their time, who just followed orders. In his 1993 book, however, Vrublevsky made an important judgment that he later omitted from the shortened 2003 version. He claimed that if Ukraine was Moscow’s colony and its leaders Kremlin puppets, then it makes little sense to expect them to have behaved like leaders of an independent state. “Their behaviour befit their circumstances” (p. 216). If Vrublevsky and his ilk believe this, then we should reasonably expect them to use the Shcherbytsky Fund to publish a series of books celebrating all of Ukraine’s first secretaries beginning with Piatakov and Gopner and including Shelest. A puppet is a puppet. But there is no hint of such a project. It seems, therefore, that all puppets are not the same and that in Vrublevsky’s eyes Shcherbytsky-type collaborators suited the circumstances better than Shelest-type collaborators.

This kind of reasoning influenced some Ukrainian historians. Blaming Russia for Ukraine’s problems, they write that “Shelest treated [his] republic’s interests as primary,” and equivocate in dealing with collaborators like Shcherbytsky. In an ostensibly authoritative six-volume political history of twentieth-century Ukraine released last year, it took five people to write the chapter covering the sixties, seventies, and eighties. Using Vrublevsky as a source, they claim that because Shcherbytsky had “the traits of a patriot of Ukraine,” he tried to defend the interests of “Ukraine’s people.” They assess him as a lesser evil without saying what the greater evil might have been. But seventy pages later they write: “The servility of Ukraine’s authorities [under Shcherbytsky] resulted in colossal human, material, spiritual, and cultural losses for Ukraine.”³¹

31. I.F. Kuras et al., eds., *Politychna istoriia Ukrainy XX stolittia u shesty tomakh* (Kyiv: Heneza, 2003), 6: 223–7, 293. The authors do not actually give any examples of what precisely Shcherbytsky did to “successfully defend the interests of the republic.” Moscow rejected his June 1989 request that it stop building more nuclear power stations in Ukraine.

Shcherbytsky's appointees did not fight in defence of the old order. They survived the transition, formed "clans" and became the political-economic elite in 1991. Since then the Kyiv, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk clans have been keeping Ukraine Soviet, although not as successfully as their Belarusian friends. Unlike their Belarusian counterparts, they have had to contend with a strong national-cultural elite and a popular majority that considers itself Ukrainian rather than Soviet, Russian, Eastern Slavic, or "local." According to a 2000 survey, while thirty-eight percent of Ukraine's population consider themselves Russian or Soviet, sixty-six percent consider themselves Ukrainian. Fifty-two percent speak Ukrainian at home, fifty-three percent belong to a Ukrainian national church, twenty-five to thirty percent of the Orthodox faithful do not recognize the Russian patriarch, and thirty-three percent think that the collapse of the USSR was good for Ukraine.³² Ukraine's Neo-Soviet Russophile leaders recognized persons and events forbidden in Soviet times, without dispensing with the Russian-unity rhetoric and Soviet or Russian commemorations that pleased some of their likeminded conationals.

Others were not pleased. On the academic level, for instance, two Russophile historians have claimed that the government's post-1991 Ukrainian history textbooks are too "anti-Russian." In their opinion, these textbooks were sponsored by "descendants of Suslov and Zhdanov," whose "maniacal" obsession with power led them to exploit Ukrainian nationalism, which they had condemned previously when they were Soviet functionaries. Assuming that the Ukrainian and Russian pasts constitute a single national history, the two authors claim that those who share their opinion are ideologically "unengaged," while their opponents are engaged and biased. The only text-book they praise is "written in the spirit of the Soviet historiographical tradition."³³ On the popular level,

32. A. Kolodii, "Radianska identychnist ta ii nosii v nezalezhnii Ukraini," in *Ukraina v suchasnomu sviti: Konferentsiia vypusnykiv prohram naukovoho stazhuvannia u SSHA*, ed. O.V. Haran et al. (Kyiv: Stylos, 2003), 38, 39. Those who consider themselves Ukrainian are almost equally divided between those who agree and disagree. On average three times more Russians and Soviets think that the collapse of the USSR was bad than think it was good (50).

33. L. Moisienkova and P. Martsinkovskii, "Rossiia v ukrainskikh uchebnikakh istorii," in *Rossiia i strany Baltii, Tsentralnoi i Vostochnoi Evropy, Iuzhnogo Kavkaza, Tsentralnoi Azii: Starye i novye obrazy v sovremennykh uchebnikakh istorii: Nauchnye doklady i soobshcheniia*, ed. F. Bomsdorf and G. Bordiugov (Moscow: Fond Fridrikha Naumanna,

there is a front organization of the Ukrainian Communist Party named the All-Ukrainian Union of Descendants of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Headed by the party leaders Petro Symonenko and Leonid Grach, this association condemns the “global financial oligarchy” and its plans to subordinate Ukraine to “Euro-Atlantic civilization.” In July 2003 it awarded prizes to ten Russian and Ukrainian high-school students who had won its competition for the best essays on the topic, “Ukraine + Russia = Love.” In March 2004 it awarded another set of prizes for a high-school student essay competition on “the significance of the 350th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Council and its role in strengthening and developing the friendship of the Ukrainian and Russian nations.” The themes in the competition announcements and the winning essays reflect the ideas of the 1954 “thesis.”³⁴

On the very fringe of Ukraine’s society a group of latter-day Little Russians and Russian nationalist extremists claims there is no such thing as a Ukrainian nationality, only a Little Russian branch of the Russian nation. These people attach no significance to Kyiv’s official Ukrainian-Russian unity rhetoric and ignore critical interpretations of Ukrainian-Russian relations.³⁵ For them the Treaty of Pereiaslav is important because it made Russia a world power. But until the end of the eighteenth century, they complain, it brought Russia no income from Ukraine and no benefits to common Little Russians, who suffered at the hands of their Cossack leaders. Ukrainians, they claim, are not a nationality, but a

2003) 70, 81, 91. Despite their polemical Russian bias, the authors do correctly note the lack of balanced accounts of Ukrainian-Russian relations written from regional perspectives. This book was funded by AIRO-XX, an organization sponsored by the Friedrich Naumann Fund, whose publications dealing with former non-Russian Soviet nationalities have a distinct neo-Soviet revanchist tone.

34. The group is on a Russian-only website (www.edinenie.Kiev.ua) with a direct link to the Russian Orthodox Church site. The winning essays are supposed to be published. That same year a Canadian Ukrainian foundation sponsored a competition for the best student essay on “The Consequences of the Pereiaslav Treaty for Ukraine,” which was published in Ia. Davydenko et al., *Naslidky Pereiaslavskoi rady 1654 roku: Zbirnyk statei*, ed. I. Hrych (Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 2004).

35. S. Grigoriev, “Nuzhen novyi Pereiaslav,” *Verzhe*, 12 February 2004. According to this Zaporizhian journalist the views of Ukraine’s National Institute of Strategic Research and the historians in *Pereiaslavska rada* reflect “a temporary political conjuncture.” They repeat ideas formulated during the mid-nineteenth century by “western” intelligence services, which were intended to destroy the unity of the Slavs and which were adopted later by “activists of the Galician diaspora.” Grigoriev works for one of Boguslaev’s companies.

political party. Nurtured by stupid tsarist policies and naive “bleeding-heart” Russian liberals, after 1918 this party was fostered by the Communists and, finally, it came to power in 1991. Today, with the Kremlin’s complicity, it rules what should be part of Russia. Ukraine’s political leaders are anti-Russian, Russia’s leaders are pro-Ukrainian, and Ukraine’s Russians and Little Russians are lost because they are being Ukrainianized and no longer care about Russian culture.³⁶ These people are troubled by the fact that Russia finally ratified the delimitation of the border in 2004 and that, with EU assistance, Ukraine is turning its side of the border into a visible barrier. Not only do travelers see where Ukraine ends and Russia begins, but as of January 2004, for the first time since 1918, they must have passports to cross the border.

The official pro-Soviet and pro-Russian rhetoric and commemorations reflected the interests of the Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk clans, which were represented by President Kuchma, Viktor Medvedchuk, and Prime Minister Yanukovich. But they lacked internal logic and state-building rationale. First, the Kuchma-Medvedchuk circle sought to exploit the division in between pro- and anti-Russian or anti-Soviet groups in Ukraine, but it realized that it could exploit this latent east-west or nationalist-Soviet division only so far and did not attempt to commemorate simultaneously figures like Symon Petliura and Grigorii Piatakov at the one extreme, nor the national-communist Mykola Skrypnyk and the enlightened nobleman Vasyl Karazin, figures who arguably could have bridged the differences between the hostile groups, at the other extreme.³⁷ Thus Ukraine’s rulers excluded both the most and the least

36. S. Sidorenko, “Novaia Rossiia i byvshaia malorossiia,” *Moskva*, 2003, no. 11: 129–57. This January the editorial board awarded the author, who lives near Kremenchuk, an annual prize. See also a similar piece by a Ukrainian citizen from Zaporizhzhia who seems to be affiliated with only Russian institutions: V. Talinin, “Malorossiia v obiatiiakh globalizma i ‘ukrainskii natsionalizm,’” *Moskva*, 2002, no. 8: 160–71. Both articles can be found at <www.moskvam.ru>. In Moscow a Mikhail Smolin specializes in re-printing turn-of-the-century Ukrainophobic polemics: S. Shchegolev, *Istoriia “ukrainskogo” separatizma*, and “*Ukrainskaia bolezn*” *Russkoi natsii* (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Imperskaia Traditsiia, 2004). In his introduction to the first book Smolin, reiterating the early twentieth-century ideas of Russian Black Hundred writers, notes that “Ukraine” and “Ukrainians” are ideas invented by Turkic-Russian half-breeds, papal agents, and various demented reprobates to destroy Russia (17–23).

37. The government did not commemorate the 130th anniversary of Khrystian Rakovsky’s birth in 2003. This native Bulgarian was the first Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR. Beginning his political career in Ukraine as a centralist

divisive events and figures from their post-1991 national pantheon. As Mykola Riabchuk observed, Kuchma's government did not want reconciliation between pro- and anti-Russian or anti-Soviet groups in Ukraine. Artificially stimulating internal tensions by playing the latent fears of one group off against those of the other was hardly the way to create a new state, but it did enable the neo-Soviet Kuchma and Medvedchuk clans to present themselves as moderate centrists and, thereby, keep themselves in power. Official recognition of select Communist and non-Communist persons and events undercut both the organized Communist and organized national-democratic opposition to them.³⁸ Their pro-Russian rhetoric, meanwhile, justified a foreign policy that intended to make independent Ukraine into a neo-Soviet Russian vassal state.

Kuchma's government officially commemorated mutually incompatible events and persons. If collaborators like Shcherbytsky deserved to be commemorated for protecting Ukraine's interests against Moscow then it made no sense to commemorate a treaty that led to the situation in which Ukraine needed Shcherbytsky's protection. This public calendar violated logic, but it had a short-term political rationale: it helped to keep society divided and the opposing groups at odds. Future historians will determine whether or not the Kuchma-Medvedchuk group envisaged the Shcherbytsky and Pereiaslav commemorations as part of a presidential election strategy intended to generate an east-west or Ukrainian-Russian split within the country that it could then pretend to heal.

In Russia, alongside the government-sponsored neo-Slavophile imperial nostalgia, there is an extremist fringe of anti-Ukrainians, which together with its Little Russian brothers, celebrates the 1654 treaty as a "reunion."³⁹

who thought that making Ukrainian the state language was counter-revolutionary, he became a close ally of Skrypnyk and a strong advocate of autonomy and Ukrainization.

38. M. Riabchuk, *Dvi Ukrainy: Realni mezhi, virtualni viiny* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2002), 96–196.

39. The Russian media promulgate such opinions and they still figure in some treatments of Russian history. See L. Males and B. Motuzenko, *Vzaemni etnichni obrazy ukrainsiv ta rosiian u mas-media* (Kyiv, 2002); Ukrainian-related entries in *Entsiklopediia russkoi istorii*, ed. N.A. Benediktov, N.E. Benediktova. and E.N. Bazurina (Moscow: EKSMO-Press, 2000), and the above-mentioned *Sviataia Rus': Bolshaia entsiklopediia russkogo naroda* (cf. 8). This year's reprint edition of Shchegolev's infamous *Istoriia "ukrainskogo" separatizma* makes no reference to the Pereiaslav anniversary. For examples of current serious historical writing, see Ukrainian-related issues in *Novaia*

Nevertheless, except for an exhibition at the Russian Historical Museum and two articles in the January issue of *Rodina*, the government and Russians ignored the 350th anniversary.⁴⁰ In Ukraine articles about the events of 1654 published in the major academic and quality monthlies basically summarized views detailed in *Pereiaslavska rada*.

As students taught according to books like *Pereiaslavska rada* grow up, and adults taught according to the 1954 “thesis” die off, popular memory and academic interpretation of Ukrainian-Russian relations will converge. Pro-Soviet and pro-Russian commemorations of 1654 will become politically superfluous and will disappear from the public calendar.

Changes along the Ukrainian-Russian border also suggest that the “reunion” interpretation of Ukrainian-Russian relations could gradually fade away. Heavy trade, family ties and common interests between Kharkiv Oblast in eastern Ukraine and Belgorod Oblast in southern Russia have given rise to the idea of a Slobozhanshchyna Euroregion among the young generation of politicians, business leaders, and academics on both sides of the border. Concerned about Ukrainian-Russian relations as much as about their democratic “European” image abroad, these people reject historical interpretations based on imperial ideas of Slav unity. “It seems that the regional elites of eastern Ukraine (in our case, of Kharkiv Oblast), whose legitimacy depends on Ukrainian statehood but whose economic interests are closely linked to Russia, are interested in an ideology of Ukrainian-Russian cooperation which would stress the Ukrainian ‘origins’ of the region but would also provide a justification for ‘traditional’ [understood locally as voluntary and beneficial—S.V.] relations with Russia.”⁴¹ However, as the new Ukraini-

rossiiskaia entsiklopediia, ed. A.D. Nekipelov, vol. 1 (Moscow: Entsiklopediia, 2003) or *Rossiiskii entsiklopedicheskii slovar*, ed. A.M. Prokhorov, 2 vols. (Moscow: Bolshaia rossiiskaia entsiklopediia, 2000).

40. In the first article Rafalsky listed beneficial short-term and deleterious long-term results of the treaty for Ukraine. In the second article two Russian historians focused exclusively on its benefits. O. Rafalsky, “Naibolshaia legenda slavianskoi istorii,” and N. Petrukhintsev, A. Smirnov, “Brak po raschetu,” *Rodina*, 2004, no. 1: 10–19. This glossy magazine is financed by the government. The January issue was devoted to the 100th anniversary of the Russo-Japanese War. A conference on the Treaty of Pereiaslav in St. Petersburg was funded by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.

41. T. Zhurchenko, “Cross-Border Cooperation and Transformation of Regional Identities in the Ukrainian-Russian Borderlands: Towards a Euroregion ‘Slobozhanshchyna’?” part 2, *Nationalities Papers*, 2004, no. 2: 504.

an-Russian relations in the border regions develop, it is unlikely they will repeat old imperial and Soviet models.

In this age of pop-culture the average person has little interest in, and knowledge of, history, and this ignorance can just as soon nullify the impact of hostile/old-imperial stereotypes as reinforce them. When today's young Ukrainians look back at 2004, will they think of Ruslana, "Wild Dances," and the Eurovision Song Contest, or of Russia, Pereiaslav, and the Congress of the Slavic Peoples? Reflecting on Ruslana's success a newspaper reader perceptively wrote that he considered Verka Serdiuchka a representative of Ukraine's Little-Russian Soviet past and Ruslana a representative of the country's European future.⁴² Appropriately, Verka supported Yanukovich, while Ruslana declared herself for Yushchenko in the presidential election. Russian youth, for their part, are more interested in Pugacheva than Pugachev, and how many of them could distinguish between Shukshin, Utkin, Pushkin, Putin, and Apukhtin is moot.⁴³

One likely result of Yushchenko's victory is that Ukraine's fringe groups, which, like warts, are always with us, will continue to celebrate 1654 and fondly remember the Bruikhovetskys, Shcherbytskys and Verkas. But whether the country's organized neo-Soviet Russophiles and Little Russians will be as harmless as Canada's United Empire Loyalists or as influential as Northern Ireland's Orange Order remains to be seen. Will they celebrate the 340th anniversary of Briukhovetsky's "Moscow Articles of 1665 in 2005?"

Ironically, Yushchenko was born in 1954. Will his election victory mark 2004 as the last year of Ukraine's "Dnipropetrine period" and the beginning of the end of what began 350 years ago and was celebrated with such gusto when he was born? How his government commemorates the Battle of Poltava in 2009 will tell us much about its direction.

42. *Den*, 18 May 2004.

43. The average non-history major Russian university student's knowledge about his country's past may be found in examination answers compiled by Prof. G. Druzhinin: <http://zhurnal.lib.ru/d/druzhinin_g_g/responce.shtml>. Here, among other things, we learn that before 1917 Kyivan Rus' was called Ukraine and that Kyivan Rus' began when the Russian, liberated Ukraine from the Germans and joined it to Russia.