
This is a festschrift in honor of Zenon Kohut, director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies and noted author of Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate (1988). Kohut’s latest work on the Synopsis (1674–1680), a Kyivan Cave Monastery text suggesting Ukrainians’ alternate views on Muscovite concepts of statecraft, inspired the festschrift’s title. Besides an intellectual biography of Kohut by Kharkiv historian Volodymyr Kravchenko, it contains articles by a number of scholars from the United States and Canada, Central Europe, and Ukraine. These contributions are not arranged thematically, but alphabetically, by the last name of the author. Three of them (by Kravchenko, Natalia Iakovenko, and Father Iurii Mytsyk) are in Ukrainian, while the rest are in English. As with most festschrifits, the articles in Synopsis vary greatly in quality and length, as well as in breadth of research themes. Covering Ukrainian history from the time of Kyivan Rus’ to independent Ukraine, they range from studies of individual texts and reproductions of them to questions about Russian rulers’ policies toward Ukrainians in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Despite this great variation in themes, the articles in Synopsis make insightful contributions to issues in Ukrainian, Russian, and Eastern European history. One such issue is the history of Russian-Ukrainian relations, a theme central to Kohut’s own work. Articles point to the crucial role such relations played in the emergence and evolution of the Russian Empire and its later Soviet counterpart. Paul Bushkovitch writes about informal networks that emerged between Russian boyars and officials of the Hetmanate from the 1654 Pereiaslav Treaty to the first abolition of the office of hetman in 1722. His meticulous research of such networks underscores their importance in the Hetmanate’s integration into an
emerging Russian Empire, regardless of whether or not they led to Hetmanate officials gaining Moscow's ear in policy decisions or Moscow elites influencing events in the Hetmanate. Alfred Rieber's analysis of public debate on constructing the Russian Empire's first railroad line through Ukrainian lands in 1863–1864 reveals the imperial elites' ambiguous relations with the West, namely their aspirations to compete with European markets and yet contain dangerous political elements among national minorities on the western borderlands. David Saunders, in examining Russian nationality policies toward Ukrainians in imperial Russian and Soviet times (1847–1941), challenges much of current scholarship by showing both imperial and Soviet policy makers expressing hostility toward Ukrainians as a national community due to their large numbers (the second largest ethnic group besides Russians in imperial and early Soviet times) and their perceived connections to "hostile" forces in the West (namely Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Poland). While controversial in its conclusions, it calls on historians to avoid lumping non-Russians into one group when dealing with imperial Russian and Soviet practices of empire.

Other contributions to *Synopsis* point out the unintended consequences of imperial Russian policies. Olga Andriewsky suggests that changes in tsarist higher educational institutions and a Ukrainian demographic boom prior to World War I brought about a new generation of Ukrainian activists—the "Generation of 1917"—committed to championing independence in 1917–1920. Marta Bohachevsky-Chomiak demonstrates, through Russian imperial police records in Warsaw, the politicization of Ukrainian peasants and others on the Western borderlands through increased police surveillance of things like the making of hostile remarks toward the tsar, spreading socialist literature, and showing an interest in "heretical" religious activities (such as those of Catholic organizations). Mark von Hagen's essay on Hetman Pavlo (Pavel) Skoropadskyi highlights the radical changes in political orientation taking place among the empire's most loyal servitors due to the upheaval caused by total war and revolution in 1917–1918. Skoropadskyi, an imperial Russian general, turned to Ukrainian state building to fight Bolshevism and establish a new, federal Russian state, earning him enemies among Russian and Ukrainian political circles.

This festschrift highlights issues of identity in medieval and early modern Eastern Europe. Jaroslav Isaievych traces the impact of such Western titles as *korol* (king) and *hospodar* (lord) on this region. The term *korol* not only came to be used in the medieval principality of Galicia-Volhynia, but it also led to the notion of a "Kingdom of Rus" employed by Polish and Hungarian rulers in the fourteenth century and later alluded to by their successors, the Habsburgs. This notion of a separate kingdom suggests Ukrainians' early connections with Western Europe, though the actual functions of such titles, as Isaievych himself admits, reflected local circumstances. Similarly, *hospodar* was a term that migrated from
Western Europe to Galicia and from there to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Moldova, and Muscovy, suggesting the Ukrainian regions’ role in the exchange of ideas between Eastern and Western Europe.

In being situated in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Ukrainians before the age of modern nationalism came to identify themselves as distinct from a Polish “other.” Natalia Iakovenko, studying Kyiv Mohyla Academy scholars’ 1648 panegyric to Prince Iaremia Vyshnevets’kyi and various genealogies connected with Vyshnevets’kyi’s family, suggests that the panegyric’s authors appealed not just to the prince’s imagined links to Lithuanian and Czech royalty, but also to the lands of Rus’. This reflected the Kyivan elites’ efforts to identify themselves with the Commonwealth (and thus oppose the Cossack rebels Prince Iaremia was to defeat), yet also promote a sense of identity connected with an earlier “imagined community” of Rus’. Frank E. Sysyn emphasizes the Poles’ becoming an “other” against which the people of Rus’ defined themselves. Sysyn demonstrates that Samiilo Velychko’s chronicle of the 1720s, the *Skazanye*, refers to Poles as a brother Sarmatian nation that came to betray, and then exploit, the brother Sarmatian nation known today as Ukraine. In employing such attributes toward Poles from a number of social spheres, this chronicle defined a national community in opposition to a Polish one in an age before modern nationalism.

Articles in this festschrift reassess historical myths connected with Ukraine. Oleksiy Tolochko reveals that Vasiliy Tatishchev’s eighteenth-century historical forgeries led to assumptions that the Rostov-Suzdal principality and the Halych-Volodymyr principality formed the basis for Russian and Ukrainian national histories respectively. Orest Pelech depicts members of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood not as early nationalists or social democrats, but as imperial subalterns engaged in Russifying Polish Kyiv, proposing “an alternative, polycentric interpretation of east Slavic history” (p. 344) that tsarist officials found highly unsettling. Iaroslav Hrytsak dispenses with Soviet-era myths about Ivan Franko’s portrayal of the Boryslav oil fields in late nineteenth-century Galicia. Franko projected class struggle onto Boryslav to foment a workers’ revolution. He soon abandoned such ideas, seeing national exploitation instead at work in Galicia. Serhii Plonhys suggests that Soviet Marxist attacks on Mykhailo Hrushevskyi’s conception of history in the 1920s and 1930s discredited nationhood as a factor in Ukrainian history, yet paradoxically affirmed assumptions by Hrushevskyi and other populists that peasants played a progressive role in the Khmelnytskyi Uprising. Bohdan Kliď successfully argues that the “statist” school of Ukrainian historiography, attributed to Viacheslav Lypynskyi, had earlier origins within Ukrainian “populist” historiography, where historians increasingly turned to political elites and institutions as Ukrainians shifted to more radical political activism at the turn of the century. David Marples’s discussion on Western and Ukrainian interpretations of the 1932–1933 famine concludes that, despite continued contro-
versy over whether or not the famine was an act of genocide by Stalin and other Soviet rulers against the Ukrainian nation, recently published documents strongly indicate that it was. Essays by John-Paul Himka on interpretations of Carpathian icons and Volodymyr Kravchenko on *Istoriia rusiv* in today’s Ukraine highlight ongoing problems of imposing national “essences” on historical sources or (in the case of *Istoriia rusiv*) uncritically accepting their “facts” about the past.

Contributions to *Synopsis* could have been more explicitly tied to existing scholarship on Eastern Europe and Europe as a whole. Von Hagen admittedly deals with Skoropads’kyi in the context of the Great War, and Andriewsky employs historian Robert Wohl’s notion of the “Generation of 1914” (*The Generation of 1914* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979]) to construct her analysis of the Ukrainian “Generation of 1917.” Yet Bohachevsky-Chomiak’s highly engaging essay, “Not Quite Martin Guerre,” would have benefited even more from some comparisons with Natalie Zemon Davis’s *The Return of Martin Guerre* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983) and other works dealing with microhistory. Pelech’s study on the Cyril and Methodius Society would have profited from a discussion of recent scholarship on nationalism in the region by Andreas Kappeler, Alexei Miller, and Timothy Snyder. Saunders’s highly intriguing essay assumes continuities between Russian and Soviet policy makers, but it fails to consider major discontinuities (such as the fact that Soviet authorities never banned Ukrainian-language publications outright and that Ukrainian Communists, not just “Russians,” were responsible for the famine of 1932–1933). *Synopsis* also makes for difficult reading due to a lack of coherent themes structuring the collection as a whole. Yet some rewarding finds among these essays highly recommend it for specialists in the history of Ukraine, Russia, and Eastern Europe.

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